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Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes 
Jens David Ohlin* 
Abstract 
 
The following article is an attempt to provide a coherent theory that international 
tribunals may use to ground the imposition of vicarious liability for collective crimes. Currently, 
the case law and the literature is focused on a debate between the Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(JCE) doctrine applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the co-perpetration doctrine applied by the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
which defines co-perpetrators as those who have joint control over the collective crime. The latter 
doctrine, influenced by German criminal law theory, has recently won many converts, both in 
The Hague and in the Academy, because it allegedly avoids many of the pitfalls and excesses 
associated with the JCE doctrine, including vicarious liability for actions that fall outside the 
scope of the criminal plan (JCE III), the most expansive version of the doctrine. The following 
Article subjects the control theory, the new darling of the professoriate, to renewed scrutiny and 
questions whether “control” is the most important criterion for collective crimes. This Article 
defends the claim that the most essential aspect to ground vicarious liability for members of a 
criminal gang is the mens rea of its individual members. These individuals share with each 
other a joint intention that the group commits a collective crime, and through a series of 
hypothetical examples, I argue that this fact ought to be the most central aspect of the doctrine. 
The original version of JCE doctrine did little to analyze these joint intentions, although it 
implicitly relied on them, and the co-perpetration theory has sought to sidestep them by 
emphasizing “control” instead. But this is an overreaction. The proper course is to return mens 
rea to the center of the debate and develop a nuanced account of joint intentions that avoids the 
excesses of the JCE doctrine. Instead of replacing JCE with the control theory of perpetration, 
international courts should reform JCE by eliminating JCE III because it fails to comply with 
the underlying theory supporting the doctrine. 
 
  
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. An excerpt from this article will be published as 
a book chapter entitled Joint Intentions, in François Tanguay-Renaud and James Stribopoulos, eds, 
Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (forthcoming 2011). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Collective criminal action has been—and remains—the most contentious 
area of substantive international criminal law. Three doctrines for imposing 
individual liability for collective endeavors have obsessively dominated the case 
law and literature, stretching from Nuremberg to the most current 
pronouncements of the ICC. These doctrines are: (i) conspiracy, (ii) Joint 
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Criminal Enterprise (JCE),1 and (iii) co-perpetration. Although the favored 
doctrines keep changing, the central issue always remains how to hold a 
defendant responsible for the actions of another. In this Article, I attempt to 
shift the focus away from the standard debate regarding the relative merits and 
demerits of these three doctrines. This Article attempts to cut across the 
spectrum in a new way and focus instead on the commonalities of these theories 
in an attempt to elucidate an underlying theory to explain and ground how 
individual liability can be generated from collective endeavors. In this regard, 
international criminal lawyers should be particularly concerned with finding a 
theory that adequately explains vicarious liability for group crimes, that is, the 
imposition of liability to all participants for the criminal actions of a colleague.  
In order to accomplish this goal, it is important to first explain the 
relationship between the three doctrines. Consequently, Section II argues that 
JCE is just a new variant of the common law conspiracy doctrine, despite 
repeated protestations to the contrary from the ad hoc tribunals. The underlying 
and essential criterion that unites the two doctrines is the existence of a criminal 
agreement between the parties. A criminal agreement provides externalized 
evidence that the parties intend for the crime to be committed. Section III then 
extends this analysis by briefly examining the two most pressing problems with 
these doctrines, and in particular conspiracy and JCE: (i) the imposition of 
vicarious liability for actions that fall outside the scope of the criminal plan, and 
(ii) the insistence that all members of the JCE are equally culpable, regardless of 
the scope of their participation in the endeavor. These difficulties crop up when 
the doctrines show insufficient attention to the question of intention. Section III 
also explains how these doctrines might be amended to resolve these difficulties. 
Finally, Section IV explains that the doctrine of co-perpetration, in particular the 
“control theory” version of the doctrine applied by the ICC, allegedly avoids 
these two problems. However, Section IV argues that control, by itself, does 
little to ground the imposition of vicarious liability and that a deeper theory 
regarding mens rea is required to do the job. Consequently, Section V offers 
such a theory. Regardless of which doctrine a court applies—conspiracy, JCE, or 
co-perpetration—some theory must explain the mental state of participants who 
                                                 
1  The three versions of JCE include co-perpetration by individuals who share the intent to commit 
the act (“JCE I”), concentration camp cases where the accused has “knowledge of the nature of 
the system of ill-treatment and intent to further the common design of ill-treatment” (“JCE II”), 
and vicarious liability for acts of others that fall outside the scope of the common criminal plan 
but are nonetheless reasonably foreseeable (“JCE III”). See Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No IT-
94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 220 (ICTY App July 15, 1999). In addition to its application at the ICTY and 
ICTR, joint enterprise liability is also used at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Wayne 
Jordash and Penelope Van Tuyl, Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof: How Joint Criminal Enterprise Lost 
its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 8 J Intl Crim Just 591, 597–98 (2010) (discussing the 
“doctrinal confusion and overreaching at the Special Court” regarding JCE application). 
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join together to pursue collective action. Strangely, although this question is 
absolutely central to the field, the international criminal law (ICL) literature has 
all but ignored the need to offer a philosophically sophisticated answer to this 
question. Section V therefore explores the most plausible answer: individuals 
form a joint or shared intention that a group of individuals commits the crime.2 By 
appealing to the philosophical literature on shared intentions (which to date has 
been generally ignored by ICL scholars),3 this Article offers a theory of collective 
criminal action that is both theoretically sound and yet also yields a legally 
workable doctrine for courts to apply. Defendants should only be held liable for 
each other’s actions when each has the intention that they commit the crime 
together. Although the answer sounds simple at first glance, the theory offers a 
profound, and much needed, answer that both grounds ascription of vicarious 
liability, but also explains why the limits (and revisions) described in Section III 
are absolutely necessary.  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSPIRACY AND JCE 
There has for some time been a division in the international case law over 
whether JCE is in fact a version of the conspiracy doctrine. In Prosecutor v Milorad 
Krnojelac,4 the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded that the doctrines were related, 
noting that a “joint criminal enterprise exists where there is an understanding or 
arrangement amounting to an agreement between two or more persons that they 
will commit a crime.”5 This view is not only entirely defensible, but also 
doctrinally necessary; the analysis in this Section will explain why. Proponents of 
JCE reject this definition because they are inclined to distance themselves from a 
formulation that sounds too much like conspiracy. The received wisdom among 
international lawyers is that conspiracy is a decidedly common law doctrine that 
finds insufficient international support to be considered part of international 
criminal law. Consequently, if JCE amounts to ersatz conspiracy, it will be 
rejected too. This is the motivation behind the attempt to find a distinction 
between the two. 
                                                 
2  The terms “joint intention” and “shared intention” will be used interchangeably in this Article. 
3  Bratman’s work on joint intentions has been incorporated into the legal literature in several 
instances, though not in the ICL context. See, for example, Daniel Markovitz, Contract and 
Collaboration, 113 Yale L J 1417, 1451–56 (2004); Scott J. Shapiro, Laws, Plans, and Practical Reason, 
8 Legal Theory 307 (2002); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist 
Approach to Legal Theory 95–100 (Oxford 2001); Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U Ill L 
Rev 341 (2009). See also Claire Finkelstein, Responsibility for Unintended Consequences, 2 Ohio St J 
Crim L 579, 587–92 (2005) (Bratman on intentions generally). 
4  Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac, Case No IT-97-25-T, Judgment (ICTY T Ch II Mar 15, 2002). 
5  Id ¶ 80. The sentence is well parsed in Alexander Zahar, Commentary, in André Klip and Göran 
Sluiter, eds, 14 Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals 841, 842 (Intersentia 2008). 
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A. The Requirement of an Agreement 
The Trial Chamber’s view in Krnojelac was hastily rejected by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber under the pretense that it was not in conformity with the 
requirements of JCE as originally articulated in Prosecutor v Duško Tadić.6 
Specifically, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial Chamber’s formulation 
because “when it assessed the intent to participate in a systemic form of joint 
criminal enterprise,” it imposed the extra requirement of requiring proof of an 
agreement “in relation to each of the crimes committed with a common 
purpose.” 7 This is curious because it is completely unclear how one can achieve 
a “common purpose” in the absence of at least some form of criminal 
agreement. A conspiracy is little more than a criminal agreement in the sense 
that the agreement is the gravamen of the offense.8 (Indeed, the very definition 
of a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to engage in an 
unlawful act.)9 The following quotation from the Appeals Chamber puts the 
problem even more sharply: 
Since the Trial Chamber’s findings showed that the system in place at the 
KP Dom sought to subject non-Serb detainees to inhumane living 
conditions and ill-treatment on discriminatory grounds, the Trial Chamber 
should have examined whether or not Krnojelac knew of the system and 
agreed to it, without it being necessary to establish that he had entered into an 
agreement with the guards and soldiers—the principle perpetrators of the 
crimes committed under the system—to commit those crimes.10  
What is striking about this passage is the dual use of the phrase “agree” in 
both contexts that the Appeals Chamber seeks to distinguish. How is it possible 
to “agree to it” if not through an agreement? Indeed, the underlying words are 
                                                 
6  Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case No IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (ICTY App Ch Sept 17, 2003), citing 
Tadić, IT-94-1-A (cited in note 1). 
7  Id. 
8  See, for example, Iannelli v United States, 420 US 770, 778 n 10 (1975) (“[T]he agreement is the 
essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is directed”); United States v Beil, 577 F2d 1313, 1315 
n 2 (5th Cir 1978), quoting United States v Feola, 420 US 671, 694 (1975) (“The law of conspiracy 
identifies the agreement to engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient threat to social 
order to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement alone, plus an overt act in 
pursuit of it, regardless of whether the crime agreed upon actually is committed.”). For a 
discussion, see Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J Crim 
L & Criminology 147, 149 n 8 (2007). 
9  See, for example, 18 USC § 371 (West 2007). See also George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
646−47 (Oxford 2000) (originally published 1978); Jens David Ohlin, Conspiracy, in Antonio 
Cassese, ed, Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 279−80 (Oxford 2009) (defining 
conspiracy as “an agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act”). 
10  Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A ¶ 97 (emphasis added) (cited in note 6). See also Zahar, Commentary at 842–
43 (cited in note 4) (discussing the Appeals Chamber’s rejection of the agreement requirement). 
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the same. Alexander Zahar expresses the question nicely when he concludes that 
there “is a difference, apparently, between ‘agreeing to the system’ and ‘entering 
into an agreement’ with the principal perpetrators.”11 The undertone of 
skepticism is warranted here because there is no doctrinally relevant difference; 
both are agreements, both are conspiracies.12 How else can one agree to the 
system? The view of JCE as a version of the conspiracy doctrine was 
subsequently also supported by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v 
Milutinović,13 which concluded that JCE was a version of conspiracy with the 
added element of “action in furtherance of that agreement.”14 Although this 
view was subsequently rejected by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v 
Brđanin,15 it was, in my view, too hastily discarded.16  
The Brđanin decision also considered the question of whether the 
prosecution must demonstrate that there was an agreement between the accused 
in the case and the principal perpetrator of the crime. The Appeals Chamber 
rejected this requirement because it found no such requirement in the Tadić 
opinion’s rendering of the standard for JCE liability.17 Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that foregoing this additional requirement meant that JCE liability 
might be imposed for individuals with a mere tenuous connection to the 
principal perpetrators.18 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that a common 
purpose may “materialise extemporaneously.”19 
This thought was then taken to its logical extreme: the Appeals Chamber in 
Brđanin concluded that the defendants could be vicariously liable for the actions 
of the physical perpetrators of the crime, even if the physical perpetrators were 
                                                 
11  See Zahar, Commentary at 842 (cited in note 5).  
12  Indeed, even the Tadić court referred to an agreement. See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 228 (cited in note 
1). 
13  Prosecutor v Milutinović, Case No IT-99-37-A, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise (ICTY App Ch May 21, 2003). 
14  Id ¶¶ 18, 23. It is not clear why the ICTY Appeals Chamber in this case referred to the act 
requirement as an added element on top of conspiracy, since many jurisdictions require “an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy” as an essential element of any conspiracy prosecution. This 
is black letter conspiracy doctrine. See United States v Rabinowich, 238 US 78, 86 (1915) (“There 
must be an overt act; but this need not be of itself a criminal act; still less need it constitute the 
very crime that is the object of the conspiracy.”). Consequently, the ICTY’s description of JCE in 
Milutinović fits squarely within the definition of a conspiracy. 
15  Prosecutor v Radoslav Brđanin, Case No IT-99-36-A, Judgment (ICTY App Ch Apr 3, 2007). 
16  See id ¶¶ 429−31 (outlining the requirements for JCE). 
17  Id ¶ 416. Again, this is somewhat strange since even the Tadić opinion referred to the “agreed 
upon” plan. See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 228 (cited in note 1). 
18  See Brđanin, IT-99-36-A ¶ 418 (cited in note 15).  
19  Id ¶ 418. See also Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 227 (cited in note 1). 
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not part of the JCE.20 Under this view, the co-defendants conspired with each 
other and formed a JCE to commit international crimes. These crimes were then 
carried out by other individuals—the physical perpetrators—but there was no 
overarching joint enterprise that connected all of them together.21 This view then 
leaves a gaping hole in the doctrine: how to link the defendants with the physical 
perpetrators and vicariously ascribe responsibility to the former for the actions 
of the latter.22 This was precisely the doctrinal raison d’être for JCE in the first 
place. Removing the physical perpetrators from the JCE just opens up the 
original issue again: the need for a linking principle to establish vicarious liability. 
The Appeals Chamber in Brđanin displayed a shocking level of indifference over 
the lack of such a linking principle, going so far as to admit in a footnote that 
they would not be providing one in the decision.23 In dicta, however, the 
Appeals Chamber suggested that such a linking principle could be established by 
something like indirect perpetration or perpetration-by-means.24 In other words, 
the co-defendants in the JCE used the physical perpetrators as mere instruments 
to carry out their criminal endeavor. But no such doctrine was fleshed out in the 
judgment and subsequent decisions have similarly failed to close this lacuna. 
This is especially problematic because it is the missing linking principle, not the 
JCE, that is doing all of the work in the argument by grounding the vicarious 
liability.25 In fact, the JCE becomes entirely irrelevant to the case. What is the 
significance of the JCE to the case if it does not connect the defendants to the 
perpetrators? 
Unfortunately, the Appeals Chamber discussion in Brđanin conflates two 
related but ultimately separate questions. The first is whether a common criminal 
endeavor must involve some form of agreement. I submit that it must, otherwise 
one conflates mere crowd behavior with the more directed behavior of a joint 
criminal plan or enterprise.26 However, the fact that a criminal endeavor arises 
from some kind of agreement is a general question separate from the more 
specific inquiry of whether a defendant has an agreement with the physical 
                                                 
20  See Brđanin, IT-99-36-A ¶ 410 (cited in note 15). 
21  See id ¶ 411. 
22  See id ¶ 412. 
23  See id ¶ 413 n 891. 
24  See Brđanin, IT-99-36-A ¶ 412 (cited in note 15). 
25  Even Judge Cassese, the jurist most responsible for the ICTY’s adoption of the JCE doctrine, has 
called the Brđanin decision objectionable, excessive, and contrary to the nullem crimen principle. See 
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 195 (Oxford 2d ed 2008). 
26  For a general discussion of the distinction between crowd behavior and concerted action, see 
Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 68−75 (Columbia 1984). See also Section IV. 
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perpetrator of the underlying criminal act. These are two separate questions, and 
the ICTY case law, in particular Brđanin, needlessly confused them.  
Simply put, it is incorrect to state that conspiracy as a mode of liability 
requires a direct agreement between the physical perpetrator of the crime and 
the defendant. True, there must be an agreement at the center of the conspiracy. 
But the physical perpetrator may have an agreement with a third party, who in 
turn has an agreement with the defendant. In this sense, the conspiracy doctrine 
only requires overlapping chains of agreement that link the physical perpetrator 
to the defendant. But no direct agreement between the two is required. Indeed, 
it is quite common for the left hand of a conspiracy to be unaware of what the 
right hand of the conspiracy is doing. Indeed, one hand may even be unaware of 
the name or identity of the right hand, but this lack of a direct connection does 
not preclude liability in the US under the doctrine of “chain conspiracies.”27 In 
such cases, the lack of a direct agreement between the defendant and the 
physical perpetrator is no bar to applying the conspiracy doctrine as long as the 
chain of overlapping agreements connects them. They are all part of the same 
joint enterprise. 
There are other devices for inferring an agreement, such as the well-known 
doctrine of hub-and-spoke conspiracies. The idea, first broached by the 
prosecution’s argument in Kotteakos v United States,28 is that “separate spokes 
meeting in a common center” could form a single conspiracy uniting all parts of 
the wheel.29 The Supreme Court refused to apply this idea to the facts of 
Kotteakos, but the concept survived and subsequent case law has refined when 
                                                 
27  See, for example, United States v Robinson, 547 F3d 632, 641 (6th Cir 2008); United States v Martinez, 
430 F3d 317, 332−33 (6th Cir 2005) (“In a drug distribution ‘chain’ conspiracy, it is enough to 
show that each member of the conspiracy realized that he was participating in a joint venture, 
even if he did not know the identities of every other member, or was not involved in all the 
activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.”); United States v Leigh, 62 Fed Appx 43, 45 (4th Cir 
2003) (“a chain conspiracy, such as that alleged here, may constitute a single conspiracy.”); United 
States v Hines, 717 F2d 1481, 1490 (4th Cir 1983) (“this chain conspiracy is not unlike other multi-
leveled drug schemes found to be part of a single conspiracy”). Compare with United States v 
Tabron, 437 F3d 63, 66 (DC Cir 2006) (stating that district courts must “make explicit findings as 
to the scope of defendant’s conspiratorial agreement before holding him responsible a for co-
conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable acts”) and United States v Childress, 58 F3d 693, 710 (DC Cir 
1995) (“Even if, for instance, there exists a core, single chain conspiracy, ‘certain players may have 
performed activities wholly unrelated to the aims of the conspiracy.’ In addition, some courts 
have been reluctant to conclude that the chain conspiracy construct can automatically bind all 
participants in a drug distribution enterprise into a single agreement . . . when there are no 
indications of interdependence between the various participants.”) (citations omitted). 
28  328 US 750 (1946).  
29  Id at 755. Compare with United States v Bruno, 105 F2d 921, 923 (2d Cir 1939) (allowing liability for 
narcotics conspiracy where other individuals formed a necessary link in the scheme of 
distribution, even in the absence of “privity” between the retailers).  
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the hub-and-spokes theory can be applied.30 The animating rationale is typically 
that a single conspiracy exists when the outer participants had no direct 
exposure to the other spokes, but knew—from logical necessity—that they must 
have existed. The classic and most common application of the theory is an illicit 
drug distribution ring, where each retailer is segregated from the others but 
knows that they must exist; otherwise, each retailer would be selling the entire 
lot smuggled into the country and not a portion thereof.31 
The distinction that Brđanin should have invoked is between explicit 
agreements formulated verbally or memorialized in writing, and implicit 
agreements where some individuals conspire together without ever meeting each 
other or communicating directly.32 It is quite common in conspiracies for some 
members to have agreed to a common criminal plan by virtue of their voluntary 
participation in the plan when they know what the plan entails and decide to 
participate in it. That is an agreement.33 To suggest otherwise is to fundamentally 
misunderstand common law conspiracy doctrine; one can agree to a conspiracy 
without ever uttering a word.34  
                                                 
30  See, for example, United States v Carpenter, 791 F2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir 1986). In Carpenter, the 
Second Circuit indicated that liability might be appropriate in cases where the existence of other 
parties could be reasonably foreseeable “as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 
agreement[.]” See id, quoting Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640, 648 (1946). See United States v 
Berger, 224 F3d 107, 114−15 (2d Cir 2000), quoting United States v Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F2d 934, 
963 (2d Cir 1990) (“Moreover, ‘a single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple conspiracies 
merely by virtue of the fact that it may involve two or more phases or spheres of operation, so 
long as there is sufficient proof of mutual dependence and assistance.’”). Compare with Model 
Penal Code § 5.03(2) (ALI 1980) (“If a person guilty of conspiracy . . . knows that a person with 
whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit 
the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he 
knows their identity, to commit such crime.”). 
31  See, for example, Bruno, 105 F2d at 923 (cited in note 29). 
32  This distinction was helpfully invoked by the Trial Chamber in the very same case, which held 
that JCE liability required an explicit agreement or understanding between the defendant and the 
physical perpetrators of the crime. Although the invocation of the concept of “an agreement” 
strikes me as absolutely correct, I am unsure if the Trial Chamber got it right when it required a 
direct connection between the defendant and the physical perpetrators, particularly since it is 
unclear whether an overlapping chain of agreements would satisfy their standard. In any event, 
the Trial Chamber’s holding was completely rejected by the Appeals Chamber in Brđanin, IT-99-
36-A ¶¶ 415–19 (cited in note 15). 
33  See, for example, United States v Parker, 553 F3d 1309, 1317 (10th Cir 2009) (“Participation in a 
conspiracy can be proven by either explicit or implicit agreement by the defendant.”); United States 
v McKee, 506 F3d 225, 238 (3d Cir 2007) (“[T]he illegal agreement can be, and almost always is, an 
implicit agreement among the parties to the conspiracy”). 
34  See, for example, United States v Price, 13 F3d 711, 728 (3d Cir 1994) (drug distribution 
conspiracies are usually implicit); United States v Zambrano, 776 F2d 1091, 1096 (2d Cir 1985) (from 
defendant’s activities finder of fact could reasonably infer knowledge, intent and agreement to 
support conspiracy conviction). 
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There is also substantial historical support for the idea that common 
purpose liability and conspiracy liability are one and the same. At Nuremberg, 
the indictments all referred to a common plan or conspiracy as a single atomic 
concept.35 The commentary of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind contained the following language: “The principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for formulating a plan or participating in a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit a crime[.]”36 It also refers to the Charter 
of the Nürnberg Tribunal (Article 6), the ICTY Statute (Article 7, paragraph 1), 
the ICTR Statute (Article 6, paragraph 1), and the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Article III, subparagraph (b)) 
(Genocide Convention).37 Furthermore, the 1950 Principles that ratified the 
outcome of the Nuremberg trials refers to participation in a “common plan or 
conspiracy.”38 Consequently, it is clear that even the UN and the International 
Law Commission believe that—at the very least—common purpose liability and 
conspiracy liability are two sides of the same doctrinal coin.39 
Further support can be drawn from the ICTR’s jurisprudence on 
conspiracy to commit genocide, the one crime in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals where the inchoate offense of conspiracy is allowed.40 In cashing out 
the essential elements of conspiracy, including inferring a tacit agreement, the 
tribunal made reference to joint action; conspiracy is established by “coordinated 
actions by individuals who have a common purpose and are acting within a 
unified framework,” such as a coalition where “those acting within the coalition 
are aware of its existence, their participation in it, and its role in furtherance of 
                                                 
35  See International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Indictment, in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals 
29–41 (1947) (referring in count one to the “common plan or conspiracy”). 
36  United Nations, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), online at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf (visited Oct 
24, 2010) 
37  See United Nations, Draft Code of Crimes (cited in note 36). 
38  See United Nations, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950), online at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_1_1950.pdf (visited Oct 
24, 2010). 
39  See Jens Meierhenrich, Conspiracy in International Law, 2 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 341, 351 (2006) 
(arguing for underlying similarities between JCE and conspiracy); Ciara Damgaard, Individual 
Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues 188–93 (Springer 2008). 
40  The basis for the asymmetry of allowing the inchoate offence of conspiracy for genocide, but not 
other international crimes, stems from the fact that conspiracy to commit genocide was explicitly 
included in the Genocide Convention. 
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their common purpose.”41 Coincidentally, these are essentially the elements of a 
joint criminal enterprise. 
Finally, the fact that JCE III allows for vicarious liability for the acts of co-
conspirators, so long as those results are foreseeable, suggests the close 
connection between the doctrine of conspiracy and JCE.42 The standard itself 
for JCE III stems from the Pinkerton v United States43 doctrine, which allows in 
US federal courts the imputation of responsibility for the acts of co-
conspirators.44 Indeed, even the language in Tadić is borrowed, inter alia, from 
Pinkerton.45 
B. Common Law Liabil ity for a Joint Criminal Purpose 
Historically, it is true that at common law, liability under the common 
purpose doctrine was a separate mode of liability that was not referred to as 
“conspiracy.” This suggests, at first glance, that there is a not insignificant 
distinction between conspiracy and a joint criminal enterprise. But deeper 
investigation reveals this to not be so. The modern doctrine dates back to Regina 
v Swindall and Osborne46 in 1846.47 Two cart drivers were racing in public and one 
of them struck and killed a pedestrian. Both cart drivers were convicted of 
manslaughter.48 However, the key element of the decision stemmed from the 
fact that both drivers had agreed to engage in the race and they were doing so 
                                                 
41  Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Case No ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 1047 (Tr Ch I 
Nov 28, 2007). 
42  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 224 n 289 (cited in note 1) (“Although there is no clearly defined doctrine 
of common purpose under the US’s Federal common law, similar principles are promulgated by 
the Pinkerton doctrine. This doctrine imposes criminal liability for acts committed in furtherance 
of a common criminal purpose, whether the acts are explicitly planned or not, provided that such 
acts might have been reasonably contemplated as a probable consequence or likely result of the 
common criminal purpose.”). 
43  328 US 640 (1946) (cited in note 30). 
44  See id at 646–48. 
45  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill University, 
Kaing Guiek Eav (Duch Case), Case No 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), ¶ 33 (ECCC filed 
Oct 27, 2008) (The Tadić Court “refers primarily to a doctrine arising from a 1946 U.S. Supreme 
Court case, Pinkerton v. U.S.”). 
46  Regina v Swindall and Osborne, [1846] 2 Car & K 230 (UK). 
47  Ambos traces the doctrine back even further to the common purpose theory of the 14th century. 
See Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J Intl Crim Just 159, 168 n 64 
(2007), citing Keith John Michael Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity 209 n 1 
(Oxford 1991). Ambos also notes that the doctrine developed into the common law concept of 
criminal conspiracy in the 17th century, citing Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv 
L Rev 922, 922–23 (1959). This supports the reading offered here that common enterprise liability 
is of a coin with criminal conspiracy. 
48  See Francis Wharton, 1 A Treatise on Criminal Law 364 (Kay and Brother 8th ed 1880).  
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negligently.49 Furthermore, individual liability could not be traced to a single 
individual because it was unclear which cart had killed the pedestrian.  
At some point in its historical evolution, US law started to deal with such 
cases as conspiracies, whereas the common purpose doctrine survived mostly in 
tort. An early example is Colegrove v The New York & New Haven Railroad Company 
and The New York and Harlem Railroad Company,50 which allowed a plaintiff to 
maintain an action against two railroads for their negligence.51 The more modern 
version of this tort doctrine exists in the form of joint enterprise liability or 
market share liability, where corporations may be held liable relative to the 
percentage of their market share in an industry that has caused injury to 
plaintiffs.52 Famous examples include birth defects caused by the drug DES, 
where industry-wide causation is established as a matter of law, but causation to 
specific defendants is impossible to identify.53 Disinclined to prevent all recovery 
in such cases, some courts allowed recovery based on market share liability to be 
used as a proxy where more finely tuned evaluations of individual causation are 
impossible. But in the criminal law, the rule of Swindall is largely forgotten and 
has long since been displaced by conspiracy and Pinkerton’s vicarious liability for 
the acts of co-conspirators.54 Although the phrase of joint enterprise liability 
                                                 
49  Id. 
50  20 NY 492 (1859). 
51  See id at 494. See also Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Law at 364 (cited in note 48) (concluding 
that the rule also “holds good in respect to all cases where an injury is produced to an innocent 
third person by a collision between two parties who are both negligent” and citing Colegrove).  
52  See Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 607 P2d 924 (Cal 1988); Naomi Shelner, Comment, DES and a 
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Ford L Rev 963 (1978). However, other jurisdictions have 
rejected enterprise liability in favor of more traditional standards requiring proof of specific 
causation. See Edward J. Schwartzbauer and Sidney Shindell, Cancer and the Adjudicative Process: The 
Interface of Environmental Protection and Toxic Tort Law, 14 Am J L & Med 1, 38 (1988) (stating 
Supreme Court’s holding regarding causation in Celotex Corporation v Catratt, 477 US 317 (1986) is 
arguably inconsistent with the enterprise liability theory since it implicitly rejects the idea that 
causation is not a part of the plaintiff’s case). 
53  See Sindell, 607 P2d at 928 (cited in note 52). See also Hamilton v Accu-tek, 935 F Supp 1307 
(EDNY 1996) (applying the doctrine to manufacturers of handguns). But see Skipworth v Lead 
Industries Ass’n, 690 A2d 169 (1997) (refusing to apply doctrine to lead pigment manufacturers). 
54  The doctrine is applied in the US only in the very limited context of negligent homicide as a result 
of a car race. See, for example, State v Martin, 539 So 2d 1235, 1239 (La 1989); State v McFadden, 
320 NW2d 608, 609 (Iowa 1982); State v Melcher, 487 P2d 3, 13–14 (Ariz Ct App 1971); State v 
Butler, 227 NE2d 627, 630 (Ohio 1967); State v Alterio, 220 A2d 451, 453–56 (Conn 1966); People v 
Kemp, 310 P2d 680, 683 (Cal Ct App 1957). It is not a general mode of liability with wider 
applicability. Joint criminal liability is now established either by Pinkerton liability or by aiding and 
abetting. See, for example, United States v Bowen, 527 F3d 1065, 1077−80 (10th Cir 2008); United 
States v Zackery, 494 F3d 644, 648 (8th Cir 2007). Only a couple of states retain a joint enterprise 
liability doctrine that is distinguishable from conspiracy or aiding and abetting. See, for example, 
State v Jefferson, 574 NW2d 268, 277–78 (Iowa 1997) (applying Iowa Code section 703.2). But see 
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continues to have some purchase in the criminal law of the UK,55 it is clear that 
these cases involve an agreement, either explicit or tacit, between the individuals, 
thus demonstrating that the doctrine is a functional analogue to the conspiracy 
doctrine as a mode of liability.56 
Regina v Powell,57 the leading UK criminal case on joint enterprise (vicarious) 
liability, is particularly illustrative. In that case, the various formulations of the 
doctrine offered by the House of Lords all included the element of an 
agreement.58 Indeed, the particular doctrinal puzzle confronted by the Lords was 
whether to properly describe the nature of the vicarious liability as actions that 
fall outside the scope of the original criminal agreement, but are nonetheless 
foreseeable, or as actions that are tacitly agreed to by the defendant by virtue of 
the fact that they were foreseeable and the defendant continued with the 
enterprise anyway. The particular choice between these two formulations is 
irrelevant for our purposes here; what matters is that the debate was entirely 
framed around the nature of the agreement at the heart of the doctrine. British 
commentators on criminal law similarly recognize the centrality of agreement as 
an essential aspect of joint enterprise liability.59  
In conclusion, the best way to understand domestic liability for joint 
enterprises is to treat it as a functional analogue to conspiracy as a mode of 
liability. The fact that UK law has conspiracy as an inchoate offense but does 
not have anything called conspiracy liability suggests strongly that what US 
                                                                                                                              
Commonwealth v Ortiz, 679 NE2d 1007, 1009 (Mass 1997) (applying joint enterprise liability as a 
form of aiding and abetting and requiring presence at the scene of the crime, knowledge that 
another intends to commit the crime or intent to commit a crime, and an agreement to be willing 
and available to help the other if necessary, thus distinguishing it from JCE); Riley v State, 878 P2d 
272, 282 (Nev 1994) (referring to conspiracy theory as a type of joint criminal liability).  
55  See, for example, Regina v Powell (Anthony) and English, 1 AC 1 (HL 1999) (UK). 
56  See Regina v Anderson and Morris, [1996] 2 WLR 1195 (UK) (tacit agreement and foresight). See also 
Richard Stone, Offences Against the Person 45−46 (Cavendish 1999). 
57  1 AC 1 (HL 1999) (UK) (cited in note 55). 
58  See also Regina v Smith (Wesley), [1963] 1 WLR 1200 (UK) (“In the view of this court, that is a 
wholly unexceptionable direction on the law except, of course, where the act can be said to be 
wholly outside the subject-matter of the concerted agreement. The terms ‘agreement,’ 
‘confederacy,’ ‘acting in concert’ and ‘conspiracy’, all pre-suppose an agreement express or by 
implication to achieve a common purpose, and so long as the act done is within the ambit of that 
common purpose anyone who takes part in it, if it is an unlawful killing, is guilty of 
manslaughter.”). 
59  See, for example, Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, Criminal Law 220–21 (Longman 3d ed 
2000), citing the case of Regina v Petters and Parfitt Crim L Rev 501 (1995) (UK) (“It is not 
sufficient that they both separately intend the same thing; they must have made it clear to each 
other, by their actions or words, that they have this common intention, though this might not be 
communicated until just before or at the point of committing the offence.”). 
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criminal lawyers call conspiracy liability, British criminal lawyers call joint 
enterprise liability. Two names, one doctrine. 
III. THE LIMITS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Having linked conspiracy and JCE together as involving a criminal 
agreement, this Section takes a more critical look at the specifics of the JCE 
doctrine, its judicial development, and its application. Section III.A examines the 
World War II precedent for JCE and concludes that there is little support for the 
ICTY’s conclusion that these cases include vicarious liability for actions that fall 
outside the scope of the criminal plan. To the contrary, Section III.B and 
Section III.C argue that the World War II cases suggest that the doctrine ought 
to distinguish between different types of actors in criminal endeavors. The best 
available distinction is between those individuals who intend for the crime to 
occur, and those who merely have some advance knowledge of the crime but 
who themselves do not exhibit an intent for the crime to happen. This crucial 
distinction will then provide the foundation for a revised theory—based on 
shared intentions—in Sections IV and V of this Article. 
A. The Shaky Foundation of JCE III 
The current trend in international penal codes is to pull back from JCE III 
(liability for the foreseeable actions of co-participants beyond the scope of the 
criminal plan). For example, Article 25 of the Rome Statute covers some of the 
same ground as JCE I, but it arguably excludes JCE III.60 The Rome Statute’s 
Article 25(3)(d), in addition to its requirement that the action must be 
intentional, also requires that the action meet one of the following two criteria: 
(i) “Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose 
of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court,” or (ii) “Be made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime.”61  
Certainly, with regard to JCE III, it is unclear which of those prongs would 
fulfill a JCE III theory. First, JCE III would appear to exclude, by definition, 
contributions that are made with knowledge of the group’s intention to commit 
the crime. The whole rationale for JCE III is the prosecution of individuals for 
actions that are foreseeable by an objective standard, even if the individual was not 
                                                 
60  See Joint Criminal Enterprise Brief of Amicus Curaie Kai Ambos, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch Case), 
Case No 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), *15 (ECCC Oct 27, 2008) (“Ambos Brief”). 
(“For the future case law of the ICC, this means that the application of JCE II (in the broad 
sense) and III on the basis of Art. 25—and this is the only basis it has—is not possible.”). 
61  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”), July 17, 1998, UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 ILM 999, Art 25. 
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consciously deliberating about such possibilities when he or she made the 
contribution; such contributions are never made knowingly. Ambos correctly 
notes that contributions under JCE III may indeed meet the criteria of acting 
with the aim of furthering the criminal enterprise,62 but it can hardly be said that 
contributions in such instances are “intentional,” unless one reduces 
intentionality to the most innocuous sense of the word to mean actions that are 
done voluntarily or without compulsion (which cannot be what the term means 
within the context of the Rome Statute).63  
This strongly suggests that liability for foreseeable actions of co-
conspirators that fall outside the scope of the criminal plan is not covered by 
Article 25(3)(d). But this is hardly surprising, since Article 25(3)(d) was enacted 
in place of a provision penalizing conspiracy as a substantive offense, which has 
been controversial in international criminal law since Nuremberg, and remains 
so today.64 Indeed, even in the US, vicarious liability for the acts of co-
conspirators falling outside the scope of the criminal plan is widely disfavored.65 
Although the Pinkerton doctrine allows such liability in federal court, many state 
jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code reject the doctrine.66 
1. The World War II case law. 
The case law foundation for JCE III is shaky. The Tadić opinion based its 
analysis on a series of previously unreported post-World War II military 
prosecutions.67 However, the case law for common purpose liability for actions 
that extend beyond the scope of the plan rested largely on Essen Lynching68 and 
                                                 
62  See Ambos Brief at *14 (cited in note 60). 
63  See Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J Intl 
Crim Just 69, 78 (2007). 
64  See George P. Fletcher, Amicus Curaie Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law in 
Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, *6 (US filed Jan 6, 2006) (“Fletcher Brief”) 
(arguing that conspiracy is not a triable offence under the laws of war). 
65  The drafters of the Model Penal Code declined to codify Pinkerton liability and instead chose more 
traditional categories of complicity such as accomplice liability and aiding and abetting. See Model 
Penal Code § 2.06 (ALI 1980). There is also a long history in the scholarly literature of objections 
to US conspiracy doctrine. See, for example, Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv L Rev 
393, 393−94 (1922). 
66  See, for example, People v McGee, 399 NE2d 1177, 1182 (NY 1979). 
67  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶¶ 195–220 (cited in note 1). 
68  Trial of Erich Heyer and Six others (“The Essen Lynching Case”), British Military Court for the Trial of 
War Criminals, Essen, 18th–19th and 21st–22d December, 1945, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals 88, 91 (UNWCC 1947) (facts and law that guided the court have to be inferred from the 
verdicts and sentences imposed and from Counsel’s arguments). 
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Borkum Island.69 The first problem with these cases is that neither case produced 
a written decision from the judges, and so the written material consists only of 
submissions from the prosecutor and defense counsel. One is left to infer 
agreement with the prosecutor’s doctrine on the basis of the judges’ decision to 
issue convictions. This is problematic purely as a matter of legal reasoning. 
Second, and more importantly, neither case involved a situation where a 
defendant explicitly agreed to a criminal plan but was convicted for the actions 
of confederates that extended beyond the scope of the criminal plan. Rather, 
these were lynchings where the deaths were attributed to the defendants by the 
judicial system, even though the prosecutors could not prove who had killed 
whom (by delivering the fatal blows). Indeed, there is not a single international 
case cited in the Tadić opinion that includes the language of liability for actions 
that were reasonably foreseeable. The Tadić court cited Pinkerton and other 
domestic cases in a footnote, but conceded that, 
reference to national legislation and case law only serves to show that the 
notion of common purpose upheld in international criminal law has an 
underpinning in many national systems. By contrast, in the area under 
discussion, national legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a 
source of international principles or rules, under the doctrine of the general 
principles of law recognised by the nations of the world: for this reliance to 
be permissible, it would be necessary to show that most, if not all, countries 
adopt the same notion of common purpose. More specifically, it would be 
necessary to show that, in any case, the major legal systems of the world 
take the same approach to this notion. The above brief survey shows that 
this is not the case.70 
In terms of more recent case law support for JCE III, the second edition 
of International Criminal Law cites Regina v Vaillancourt71 and Regina v Martineau,72 
domestic criminal law cases from Canada in 1987 and 1990 respectively,73 and 
Regina v Powell (Anthony) and Another and Regina v English,74 two cases from the UK 
in 1997. While all four cases support vicarious liability, none applies international 
                                                 
69  United States of America v Kurt Goebell et al, (Borkum Island), Case No 12–489 (1946), microformed on 
1–6 Records of United States Army War Crimes Trials, M1103 Rolls 1–7 (National Archives Microfilm 
Publications 1980), cited in Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 210 (cited in note 1). For a discussion, see Ohlin, 
Three Conceptual Problems at 75 n 10, 76 (cited in note 63) (containing discussions of, respectively, 
Borkum Island and The Essen Lynching Case); Ambos Brief at *28 (cited in note 60). 
70  Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 225 (cited in note 1). 
71  Regina v Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 SCR 636 (Can).  
72  Regina v Roderick Russell Martineau, [1990] 2 SCR 633 (1990) (Can). 
73  See Cassese, International Criminal Law at 200 n 13 (cited in note 25). 
74  Regina v Powell (Anthony) and English, 1 AC 1 (HL 1999) (UK) (cited in note 55). 
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law. The treatise also cites D’Ottavio and Others,75 a post-World War II Italian 
prosecution from 1947, which was also cited in Tadić, although that case dealt 
mostly with the concept of indirect causation and the notion of causa causae est 
causa causati.76 In D’Ottavio, civilians pursued detainees who had escaped from a 
concentration camp and all were convicted of manslaughter even though only 
one of them had actually fired a weapon at them (the others arguably pursued 
them to capture them). The Court of Cassation stated that, “[t]his foresight 
(previsione) necessarily followed from the use of weapons: it being predictable 
(dovendo prevedersi) that one of the participants might shoot at the fugitives to 
attain the common purpose (lo scopo comune) of capturing them.”77 This does 
indeed sound a lot like Pinkerton. However, the Court of Cassation was applying 
Italian criminal law, not international criminal law, which thus fails to establish 
that the doctrine can be deduced from customary international law. Aratano et 
al,78 also cited in Tadić, falls victim to the same problem.79 The Appeals Chamber 
in Brđanin cited two Control Council Law No 10 cases (Justice80 and RuSHA81), 
although neither specifically refers to a common criminal design and neither 
involves vicarious liability for acts that fall outside the scope of the criminal 
plan.82 It is therefore appropriate to ask if, prior to Tadić, there was a single case 
applying international criminal law or the international law of war that held a 
defendant vicariously responsible for the foreseeable actions of other members 
of a common criminal enterprise that nonetheless fell outside the scope of the 
criminal plan. 
                                                 
75  Cass Pen, 12 Mar 1947, n 270 (Ita), reprinted in D’Ottavio and Others Case, 5 J Intl Crim Just 232 
(2007). 
76  See Cassese, International Criminal Law at 204 n 18 (cited in note 25). 
77  Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal against Conviction), 124 ILR 61, 151 (Intl Crim Trib for the Former 
Yugoslavia 1999), quoting the judgment in Cass Pen, 12 Mar 1947, n 270 (Ita). 
78  Aratano and Others, No 102, Judgment (Ct of Cassation, Feb 21, 1949) (Ita), reprinted in 5 J Intl 
Crim Just 241 (2007). 
79  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 216 (cited in note 1). See also Ambos Brief at *29 (cited in note 47) (“[T]he 
recognition of JCE III in customary law cannot be deduced from the Italian case law quoted by 
the Appeals Chamber either, since in this trial—in contrast to the trials before British and U.S. 
American military tribunals—no international, but exclusively the national law (Art. 116 [1] of the 
Italian Codice Penale) was applied.”). 
80  United States of America v Josef Altstoetter and Others (Justice), United States Military Tribunal III, 
Judgment of Dec 4, 1947, in 3 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law No 10 954 (US 1951). 
81  United States of America v Ulrich Greifelt and Others (RuSHA), United States Military Tribunal I, 
Judgment of Mar 10, 1948, in 5 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law No 10 88 (US 1951). 
82  See Brđanin, IT-99-36-A § XIII ¶ 16 (cited in note 15) (partial dissent of Judge Shahabuddeen). 
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2. JCE III and special intent. 
In a recent defense of the JCE doctrine, Antonio Cassese proposed a 
significant restriction on the application of JCE III.83 In order to remain 
consistent with the required mental element for international offenses, Cassese 
concedes that JCE III should not be used as a mode of liability for offenses that 
require a showing of special or specific intent.84 In particular, he argues that this 
restriction would apply to prosecutions for genocide, persecution, and 
aggression, since each of these offenses requires a showing that the defendant 
had a specific intent that goes beyond the fact that the defendant’s underlying 
conduct was intentional (so-called general intent).85 In the case of genocide, the 
specific intent is the intent to destroy the protected group (in whole or in part),86 
and in the case of persecution, the specific intent is the intent to discriminate 
against the group by depriving its members of fundamental rights.87 Applying 
JCE III in this context would entail convicting a defendant without the requisite 
specific intent.88 In essence, the logical extreme of the proposal would entail only 
using JCE III in cases where the mens rea of the underlying offense can be 
satisfied by recklessness or dolus eventualis, since the mens rea of a defendant in a 
JCE III case is one of recklessness—he subjectively foresees the resulting crime 
but willingly participates anyway. The two should match. 
Although this proposed contraction of the doctrine is a welcome 
development, the proposal suffers from some ambiguity regarding the scope of 
the constraint being proposed. When identifying specific intent crimes in 
international criminal law, it is important to look for both chapeau crimes and 
underlying offenses that require specific intent. For example, genocide is a 
chapeau crime so all instances of genocide, regardless of the underlying offense, 
will require specific intent.89 But other international crimes might have specific 
                                                 
83  For a general discussion, see Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility 
under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J Intl Crim Just 109 (2007). 
84  See id at 121. The terms specific and special intent (dolus specialis) are all used interchangeably here. 
85  Id. 
86  See, for example, Rome Statute, Art 6 (cited in note 61). 
87  See, for example, id at Art 7(2)(g). 
88  A similar strategy was employed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Bolden v State, 124 P3d 191, 
200 (Nev 2005) (upholding Pinkerton liability for general intent crimes but rejecting it for special 
intent offenses such as burglary and kidnapping). See also Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, and Carol S. Steiker, Criminal Law and its Processes 683 (Aspen 8th ed 2007) (referring 
to Bolden decision as “Solomonic”). 
89  See, for example, William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law 214, 221 (Cambridge 2000). But 
see Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 485 (Sept 2, 1998) 
(concluding that special intent was required for aiding and abetting genocide but not for 
complicity in genocide). For a criticism of this distinction as untenable, see Payam Akhavan, The 
 
Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes Ohlin 
Winter 2011 711 
intent in the underlying offense, and in fact many do. For example, the war 
crime of willful killing arguably excludes recklessness,90 as does the war crimes of 
willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health,91 as well as 
the war crime of willfully depriving a prisoner of war of a fair trial.92 And there 
are other examples of specific intent international crimes: the war crime of 
intentional attacks against the civilian population,93 the war crime of intentional 
attacks against civilian objects,94 the war crime of intentional attacks against 
humanitarian personnel,95 the war crime of intentional attacks that cause 
excessive damage to civilian objects,96 and the war crime of intentional attacks 
against religious and educational facilities.97  
As for crimes against humanity, the list of specific intent crimes includes 
torture and murder.98 Murder presents a whole host of problems since many 
jurisdictions allow recklessness to satisfy some form of depraved heart murder, 
while others classify such situations as a lower grade of homicide.99 Furthermore, 
the whole category of crimes against humanity should be considered a specific 
intent crime because not only must the underlying conduct be committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the perpetrator 
                                                                                                                              
Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3 J Intl Crim Just 989, 994 (2005). The Appeals Chamber 
subsequently overturned Akayesu on this point. See Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, Case Nos ICTR-96-
10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 501 (Dec 13, 2004) (mens rea of knowledge sufficient for 
aiding and abetting genocide). For analysis on this point, see Grant Dawson and Rachel Boynton, 
Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 Harv Hum Rts J 241, 261 (2008). The tension between the mens rea for 
aiding and abetting (knowledge) and the mens rea for genocide as a principal perpetrator (special 
intent) is not as worrisome, since aiding and abetting represents an inherently lower form of 
criminal participation. In contrast, the liability on JCE involves full vicarious liability for the 
actions of another individual. 
90  See, for example, Rome Statute, Art 8(2)(a)(i) (cited in note 61). 
91  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(a)(iii). 
92  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(a)(vi). 
93  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(b)(i). 
94  See, for example, Rome Statute, Art 8(2)(b)(ii) (cited in note 61). 
95  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(b)(iii). 
96  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(b)(iv). 
97  See, for example, id at Art 8(2)(b)(ix). 
98  See, for example, Rome Statute, Arts 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) (cited in note 61). Although US scholars 
debate whether torture is a specific intent crime under federal law, it is unquestioned that torture 
is a specific intent crime under international law. See Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 
Harv Intl L J 193, 207 (2010) (illustrating the US debate on torture as a specific intent crime 
through discussion of the Bybee torture memo).  
99  Even in jurisdictions that allow recklessness as a mental state for murder, nearly all classify this as 
a lower grade offence, for example second degree murder or depraved heart murder. This is 
precisely the problem of the JCE doctrine: its failure to ensure a doctrinal grading of culpability. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 712 Vol. 11 No. 2 
must also intend or know that the underlying act is part of the widespread or 
systematic attack. The requirement of intent here would foreclose JCE III under 
the new Cassese proposal. The requirement of knowledge would not be satisfied 
either; in a JCE III case, the defendant may not be aware that the underlying act 
is being committed, since he is merely being convicted for participating in the 
enterprise with knowledge that such acts are foreseeable (not actual). This 
suggests that the proposed contraction of the doctrine is quite sweeping and 
would, in fact, foreclose JCE III in most situations. 
In any event, it is unlikely that the ICTY will adopt the proposed 
contraction of JCE III, even though it was proposed by the one individual most 
responsible for the ICTY’s adoption of the doctrine in the first place. In 2009, 
Radovan Karadžić used this exact argument when he filed a pro se motion to 
dismiss all counts relying on JCE III with regard to special intent crimes.100 The 
ICTY Trial Chamber denied the motion on the grounds that it was not properly 
raised as a jurisdictional challenge.101 If the ICTY were to accept the argument 
when it finally reaches the merits of the argument (on appeal following 
conviction), doing so would involve a substantial amendment to the doctrine 
announced in Tadić, which the Appeals Chamber considers well-settled law and 
has shown little interest in revisiting despite repeated attempts by numerous 
Trial Chambers.102 
3. Conclusion. 
The support for JCE III is therefore chimerical. Other than the statutory 
basis for JCE I in Article 25(3)(d) and customary law, there remains no non-
question-begging rationale for JCE III in customary international law. It is 
perhaps for this reason that other courts have been hesitant to adopt the 
approach. In addition to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,103 the Extraordinary Chambers of the Court of Cambodia 
recently decided that JCE III did not exist under customary international law at 
                                                 
100  See Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, Preliminary Motion to Dismiss JCE III – Special Intent Crimes, Case No 
IT-95-05/18-PT, ¶ 1 (ICTY Mar 27, 2009). The motion was filed pro se because Karadžić is 
representing himself before the Tribunal; the motion credits Kevin Jon Heller and Rebecca Mori 
in a footnote. 
101  See Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, Decision on Six Preliminary Motions Challenging 
Jurisdiction, Case No IT-95-05/18-PT, ¶ 82 (ICTY Apr 28, 2009). 
102  See, for example, Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Judgement, Case No IT-97-24-A, ¶ 62 (ICTY Mar 22, 
2006). 
103  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Case No ICC-
01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Jan 27, 2007). 
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the time when the crimes of the Khmer Rouge were perpetrated in Cambodia.104 
Cassese and the editors of the Journal of International Criminal Justice argued in an 
amicus curiae brief that JCE was not created by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
Tadić, but was simply recognized by the Chamber on the basis of its analysis of 
customary international law, including cases that date back to the end of World 
War II, long before the crimes in Cambodia were committed.105 It is likely that at 
least some of these courts will recognize what scholars have increasingly 
recognized: JCE III has no basis in either the Rome Statute’s Article 25(3)(d) or 
customary international law with the exception of the recent cases adjudicated by 
the ICTY.106 
B. Differentiating Levels of Participation 
A revised doctrine of vicarious liability—whatever you call it—should 
demonstrate the sensitivity to criminal law theory that so many scholars have 
found wanting in JCE.107 One obvious place for reform is in the Rome Statute 
itself. Of course, this will not be easy, since plenty of experienced criminal law 
scholars were involved as advisors in the original Rome Statute drafting 
                                                 
104  See Kaing Guek Eav (Duch Case), Case No 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Decision on 
the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) 
(ECCC May 20, 2010) (“JCE Appeals Decision”). 
105  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese and Members of the Journal of 
International Criminal Justice on Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch Case), 
Case No 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), ¶¶ 52–59 (Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia filed Oct 27, 2008). The amicus brief was signed by Cassese, Mary De Ming 
Fan, Vanessa Thalmann, and Salvatore Zappala. 
106  It is unclear whether the decisions of the ICTY will be sufficient to establish JCE III as an 
element of customary international criminal law in the future. Arguably not, since the formation 
of a norm of customary international law requires state practice and opinio juris and the decisions 
of an international criminal tribunal are not attributable to specific states. See International Law 
Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of 
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 18 (2000), online at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376 
(visited Oct 24, 2010). It is true, however, that state practice may be attributed on the basis of the 
members of the Security Council that drafted the ICTY Statute. However, since JCE was not 
directly codified in the ICTY Statute but rather developed by the Tadić court on the basis of their 
analysis of the term “commission,” it is doubtful that one can seriously attribute state practice or 
opinio juris based on the adoption of the ICTY Statute by the Security Council. 
107  See, for example, Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, 
and John R.W.D. Jones, eds, 1 The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
767, 803 (Oxford 2002); Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility, Article 25 Rome Statute, in 
Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 743, 759 (Hart 
2d ed, special print, 2008) (noting that Article 25(3)(d) was drafted “without regard to basic 
dogmatic categories,” which will lead to interpretation problems in the future). Consider George 
P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J Intl 
Crim Just 539, 551 (2005) (discussing legality deficit).  
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process.108 Apparently, the lack of coherence in Article 25 generally did not stem 
from a lack of theoretical expertise among the drafters, but rather from the 
process of collective drafting by committee—a good way to achieve consensus 
at the cost of coherence.109 
Of course, the next question is how the Assembly of State Parties could 
amend the Rome Statute. This is an opportunity for great doctrinal 
advancement. As suggested above, the statute could explicitly reject JCE III and 
vicarious liability for foreseeable actions falling outside the scope of the agreed 
criminal plan.110 This will make clear to courts the intent of the drafters and 
block an attempt to import JCE III through the backdoor of customary 
international law, or one of the other subsections of Article 25(3).111 Second, the 
statute should offer a clear statement of the particular kind of “residual 
accessory liability” that it imposes in cases of group criminality that fall within 
JCE I. In particular, the new Article 25 should address the major doctrinal 
problem that still exists with JCE I: the fact that it fails to draw any meaningful 
distinction between the architects and organizers of a joint criminal enterprise 
and minor participants who simply contribute to the endeavor or participate as 
lower rung offenders. There is a difference, after all, between the proverbial 
Milošević who, on the one hand, directs the joint enterprise at the highest level, 
and the foot soldier who, on the other hand, merely participates in the endeavor 
at the lowest possible level. Their relative culpability demands differentiation. 
One possible solution is to codify JCE and split it into two separate modes 
of liability. The first we might call “co-perpetrat[ing] a joint criminal 
enterprise.”112 This mode of liability would be limited to individuals who fulfill 
                                                 
108  Nor does there appear to be sufficient will among the Assembly of State Parties to deal with this 
issue. At the most recent review conference in Kampala, the entire conference was devoted to 
solving the prickly problem of aggression, and Article 25 was not even identified as a pressing 
problem. 
109  But see Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility at 759 (cited in note 107) (“[A] provision drafted 
without regard to basic dogmatic categories will create difficult problems of interpretation for the 
future ICC.”). 
110  For a general discussion of the culpability constraints on such prosecutions, see Andrew 
Ashworth, A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 
New Crim L Rev 232 (2008) (rejecting John Gardner’s argument for justifying liability for 
unintended but foreseeable consequences). 
111  Increasing a defendant’s inculpation based on customary law is problematic. See Fletcher and 
Ohlin, 3 J Intl Crim Just at 557−58 (cited in note 107); Ambos Brief at *20−21 (cited in note 60). 
See also Rome Statute, Art 22 (“definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be 
extended by analogy”) and Art 23 (“A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in 
accordance with this Statute.”) (cited in note 61). 
112  This mode of liability was first discussed in Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka, Judgement, Case No IT-98-
30/1-T, ¶¶ 282–84 (ICTY Nov 2, 2001). For a full analysis of the distinction between aiding and 
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all three of the following conditions: (1) they participate in a joint criminal 
endeavor at a high level, (2) they have the intent of furthering the criminal 
purpose of the group endeavor, and (3) they are indispensable to the success of 
the joint criminal endeavor. The second mode of liability would be called “aiding 
and abetting a joint criminal enterprise.”113 This mode of liability would be 
appropriate for individuals who do not satisfy one of the three necessary 
conditions for co-perpetrating a joint criminal enterprise, either because they 
participated at a lower rung, they did not share the intent of furthering the 
criminal purpose of the group, or their contributions were not significant 
enough to warrant vicarious liability. 
The rationale for these criteria can be explained quite simply. The first 
criterion is meant to remedy the fundamental problem that JCE liability, in its 
current embodiment, makes no attempt to distinguish between principals and 
accessories.114 The second criterion is meant to limit the highest form of liability 
to those who share the criminal purpose of the group, as opposed to those who 
simply contribute to the group effort with knowledge of the group’s efforts.115 
The third criterion is meant to limit liability for co-perpetrating a joint criminal 
enterprise to those who make a contribution that is not easily substituted by 
another readily available participant. For example, the political leader who 
coordinates the military campaign of ethnic cleansing plays an indispensable role 
because his supervision is necessary to the joint criminal enterprise in its 
manifested form. The same may also be true of the concentration camp 
commander whose role is essential to the joint criminal enterprise that involves 
the systematic mistreatment of prisoners. On the other hand, the individual 
prison guard may not necessarily be indispensable, since there is a long list of 
                                                                                                                              
abetting a JCE and co-perpetrating a JCE, see Jens David Ohlin, Commentary, in André Klip and 
Göran Sluiter, eds, 14 Annotated Leading Cases 739, 748−50 (Intersentia 2008). 
113  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 273 (cited in note 112):  
The Trial Chamber believes that the Nuremberg jurisprudence and its progeny allow 
for ‘aiding and abetting’ in its traditional form to exist in relation to a joint criminal 
enterprise and in the case of such an aider or abettor, knowledge plus substantial 
contribution to the enterprise is sufficient to maintain liability. Once the evidence 
indicates that the participant shares the intent of the criminal enterprise, he graduates 
to the level of a co-perpetrator of the enterprise[.] 
114  See, for example, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 642 (ICTY Aug 2, 
2001) (guilty for co-perpetrating a joint criminal enterprise for “participation . . . of an extremely 
significant nature and at the leadership level”).  
115  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 311 (cited in note 112) (“The Trial Chamber finds that during periods 
of war or mass violence, the threshold required to impute criminal responsibility to a mid or low 
level participant in a joint criminal enterprise as an aider and abettor or co-perpetrator of such an 
enterprise normally requires a more substantial level of participation than simply following orders 
to perform some low level function in the criminal endeavor on a single occasion.”). 
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other prison guards who might step in to perform the illegal acts if the 
defendant had refused.  
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY already considered and rejected a 
version of this proposal put forth by an ICTY Trial Chamber. The Appeals 
Chamber objected that one could not combine the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise with the concepts of co-perpetration or aiding and abetting, since all 
three are modes of liability.116 According to the Appeals Chamber, the only 
permissible combination is one substantive offense and one mode of liability, 
combined together in a coherent sentence to accurately describe the criminality 
of the defendant.117 As if appealing to the universal grammar of the criminal law, 
the Appeals Chamber rejected such ad hoc combination of modes of liability as 
syntactically nonsensical.118 But this objection misunderstands the nature of the 
proposal. The idea is not to compose a sentence of criminal law out of two 
modes of liability and a substantive offence. Rather, the idea is to break up one 
inexact mode of liability—joint criminal enterprise liability—in favor of two 
more specific and accurate modes of liability: (1) co-perpetrating a JCE, and (2) 
aiding and abetting a JCE. The result is nothing less than the destruction of JCE 
as it is currently known and its replacement by a far more subtle pair of modes 
of liability that adequately capture the gradations of culpability most commonly 
found in international criminal law.  
There is already some support for this proposal to discard the current JCE 
in the ICTY case law. The Trial Chamber in Stakić arguably suggested a similar 
approach, as did the Trial Chamber in Kvočka.119 The Appeals Chamber’s 
rejection of the approach boiled down to nothing more powerful than the 
demands of stare decisis and the fact that the doctrinal amendments represented 
too far a departure from the Tadić decision that first announced the JCE 
doctrine. 
                                                 
116  See Prosecutor v Kvočka, Judgment, Case No IT-98-30/1-A, ¶¶ 79–92 (ICTY App Ch Feb 28, 2005). 
For a critical analysis of the Appeals Chamber’s decision, see Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, 
International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction 238–42 (Oxford 2008). 
117  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-A ¶¶ 91−92 (cited in note 116) (noting that aiding and abetting involves a 
lesser degree of individual criminal responsibility than co-perpetration in a joint criminal 
enterprise). 
118  See id. 
119  Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Judgement, Case No IT-97-24-T, ¶ 440 (ICTY T Ch II July 31, 2003) 
(describing co-perpetration as “an explicit agreement or silent consent to reach a common goal by 
coordinated co-operation and joint control over the criminal conduct”). The ICTY Trial Chamber 
in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Judgement, Case No IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 216 (ICTY T Ch Dec 10, 1998), 
also referred to “co-perpetrators who participate in a joint criminal enterprise,” thus suggesting 
the same distinction. But see Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶¶ 466–67 (cited in note 112). 
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C. Historical Support for JCE Differentiation 
Furthermore, there are historical precedents for the notion of aiding and 
abetting a joint criminal enterprise.120 As noted by the Kvočka Trial Chamber, 
several International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and Control Council 
Law No 10 cases convicted individuals for aiding and abetting a common 
criminal plan.121 For example, the Dachau Concentration Camp122 case involved the 
prosecution of guards whose participation in the common design varied—
participation that the prosecution described as “aiding and abetting in the 
execution of the common design.”123 Also, the Einsatzgruppen124 case established 
clear standards for making distinctions between levels of participation in a 
common criminal endeavor, thus belaying the suggestion in Tadić that common 
enterprise liability will admit no such distinctions of relative culpability.125 The 
distinctions were based on significant participation and the holding of a high 
position of responsibility or command.126 Consequently, “[t]his analysis gives 
support to the proposition that persons who assist or facilitate a criminal 
endeavor, particularly when lower down on the hierarchical ladder of the 
enterprise, act as aiders or abettors of the joint criminal enterprise.”127 
Although the Kvočka case argues that the Stalag Luft III128 case (before a 
British military court) supports its analysis, this is doubtful.129 As acknowledged 
by Kvočka in a footnote, all participants were convicted of the same charge 
regardless of their degree of participation in the criminal endeavor; their various 
                                                 
120  The historical support for this distinction is also explored by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming 
Oxford University Press book regarding the twelve cases of the US military tribunal at 
Nuremberg (on file with author) (explaining how the tribunals distinguished between co-
perpetrating and abetting a criminal enterprise).  
121  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 269 (cited in note 112). 
122  Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-Nine Others (Dachau Concentration Camp), General Military 
Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15th Nov–13th Dec, 1945, 11 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 5 (UNWCC 1947). 
123  See id at 13. 
124  The United States of America v Otto Ohlendorf and others (Einsatzgruppen), United States 
Military Tribunal II, 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law No 10 3 (US 1951). 
125  Compare Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 191 (cited in note 1) with Einsatzgruppen at 373 (cited in note 124) 
(commanders over operations have a “deeper responsibility for the crimes of the men under their 
command”). 
126  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶¶ 281–82 (cited in note 112).  
127  Id ¶ 291. 
128  Trial of Max Wielen and 17 Others (“Stalag Luft III”), British Military Court, Hamburg, Germany, 1st 
July−3d Sept, 1947, 11 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 31–53 (UNWCC 1947). 
129  See id, cited and discussed in Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 295 (cited in note 112).  
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levels of culpability were distinguished only in the sentences, which ranged from 
death sentences for the commanders to ten year prison terms for the drivers.130 
This suggests precisely the opposite approach to the one being advanced in this 
Article: the need to establish more subtle modes of liability that make gradations 
of culpability before the sentencing phase. Almelo131 is more promising.132 That 
case involved the deliberate killing of a British prisoner of war, which resulted in 
the following conclusion: “If people were all present together at the same time, 
taking part in a common enterprise which was unlawful, each one in their own 
way assisting the common purpose of all, they were all equally guilty in law.”133 
Similarly, the Kiel Gestapo134 case arguably involved aiding and abetting a joint 
endeavor, because the two drivers who were convicted in a killing performed by 
the Gestapo were convicted for their role in the joint operation. In the words of 
the prosecutor: 
If people are all present, aiding and abetting one another to carry out a 
crime they knew was going to be committed, they are taking their respective 
parts in carrying it out, whether it be to shoot or whether it is to keep off 
other people or act as an escort whilst these people were shot, they are all in 
law equally guilty of committing that offence, though their individual 
responsibility with regard to punishment may vary.135 
Interpreting the Hadamar136 case is somewhat more complicated. In that 
case, the defendants were charged with “acting jointly and in pursuance of a 
common intent and acting for and on behalf of the then German Reich . . . [as 
they did] willfully [sic], deliberately and wrongfully, aid, abet, and participate in 
the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian nationality.”137 In one sense, 
this supports our view of the new mode of liability due to its reference to aiding 
and abetting a common project. On the other hand, the charge seems to imply 
that the defendants shared the criminal purpose of the group, which under the 
Kvočka formulation would make them liable for co-perpetrating a joint criminal 
                                                 
130  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 296 n 488 (cited in note 112). 
131  Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others (“Almelo”), British Military Court for the Trial of War 
Criminals, Held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, 24th–26th Nov, 1945, 1 Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals 35, 43 (UNWCC 1947). 
132  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 297 (cited in note 112). 
133  Almelo at 43 (cited in note 131). However, the precedent is problematic because it also stands for 
the proposition of equal culpability regardless of the level of participation. 
134  The Kiel Gestapo Case, 11 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 42−44 (UNWCC 1947), part of Stalag 
Luft III (cited in note 128). 
135  Id at 43−44.  
136  Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others (Hadamar), United States Military Commission Appointed by the 
Commanding General Western Military District, Wiesbaden, Germany, 8th−15th Oct, 1945, 1 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 46−54 (UNWCC 1947). 
137  Id at 47.  
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enterprise. It is unclear from Hadamar whether the charge is meant to distinguish 
between high level co-perpetrators and low level accomplices. The Kvočka Trial 
Chamber distilled, on the basis of the factual allegations, that no intent to further 
the criminal purpose was involved in the case, because the psychiatrists 
administered injections, sometimes under duress, and there was no “indication 
that the accused shared a criminal intent to murder the Polish and Soviet 
nationals,” although their presence at the facility suggested that “by showing up 
for work daily and performing the tasks assigned to them, they substantially 
assisted and facilitated the killings.”138 
D. Objections to Differentiation 
One obvious objection must be considered at this point. If the principle of 
culpability demands that we draw distinctions between the highest and lowest 
offenders, why not simply eliminate JCE entirely and replace it with the more 
traditional categories of principals and accessories? Judicious application of 
Ockham’s razor would counsel in favor of the simplest, most economical 
categories to make these distinctions. Indeed, the Stakić Trial Chamber seemed 
motivated to reject JCE in favor of less controversial, more time-tested modes 
of liability that might accomplish the task more effectively. And certainly, 
international criminal law is not unfamiliar with individualized conduct; it is 
indeed possible for an individual to be a co-perpetrator, or to aid and abet a 
more discrete, isolated individual crime. For example, two soldiers might 
commit a war crime together as co-perpetrators, where the war crime in question 
is discrete in time and place and unconnected to a larger collective endeavor that 
justifies the label of a joint criminal enterprise. Although such individuals would 
rarely be tried before an ICC plagued by insufficient resources and inclined to 
use its prosecutorial discretion to deal with the “most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community,”139 other tribunals, either ad hoc or hybrid, may 
indeed prosecute such individuals. Some critics of JCE focus their attention on 
this model of pure individual criminal conduct and therefore conclude that JCE, 
or its domestic analogues, should be entirely excised from the criminal law,140 
rather than simply amended as I have argued here. 
                                                 
138  Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 304 (cited in note 112). 
139  Rome Statute, Preamble (cited in note 61). 
140  See, for example, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 649 (stating that “the availability 
of conspiratorial and vicarious liability has inhibited the refinement of the common-law criteria of 
complicity”) and 660 (concluding that if Anglo-American law “were ever to admit of a more 
refined classification of actors as accessories and perpetrators, the system would have to abandon 
the doctrine of conspiratorial complicity”) (cited in note 9); Phillip Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime 
of Conspiracy, 61 Cal L Rev 1137, 1139 (1973).  
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This conclusion would be too hasty. There is value to branding a defendant 
a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise rather than a co-perpetrator 
simpliciter. The former correctly tracks the reality of the situation: that the 
defendant presided as a co-perpetrator not over, say, a two person collaboration, 
but over a potentially massive joint criminal enterprise that involved hundreds or 
perhaps even thousands of criminals. Such enterprises are, in a sense, the heart 
of international criminal law, since genocide and crimes against humanity are 
rarely carried out by isolated individuals acting alone.141 The typical pattern is 
group criminality. Indeed, recognition of this fact is precisely why the Tadić 
court was so motivated to develop the joint criminal enterprise doctrine in the 
first instance.142 The motivation is correct. 
The question is how to develop a sophisticated doctrine that navigates 
between the collective nature of international criminality and the individualized 
determinations of criminal law. Nuremberg arguably swung too far in the other 
direction by declaring certain organizations criminal and penalizing membership 
in them.143 But the opposite is no solution either. Eliminating joint enterprise 
liability and every version of the conspiracy doctrine would fashion a legal 
doctrine that fails to mirror the structure of the very criminal conduct that it 
seeks to capture in its doctrinal categories, because the conduct of individuals 
during war time involves collective or group effort. The solution is to develop a 
doctrine that models group criminal behavior but only imposes liability relative 
to the contributions of the specific defendant. The result would be a doctrine 
that is both accurate to the realities on the ground and consistent with the 
principle of culpability. In the common law, the conspiracy doctrine (correctly 
conceived) fulfills this mandate. In German theory, the concepts of 
Organisationsherrschaft and Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat do similar work.144 My 
                                                 
141  But see Ambos, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 183 (cited in note 47) (arguing for the “criminal enterprise as 
the starting point of attribution in international criminal law”). The suggestion stems from the 
German doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft and a resulting “mixed system of individual-collective 
responsibility” (presumably constrained by the principle of individual culpability). Id.  
142  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 191 (cited in note 1) (“Most of the time these crimes do not result from 
the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: 
the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common 
criminal design.”). 
143  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art 9, 59 Stat 1546, 82 UNTS 284 (Aug 8, 1945). 
However, the membership offense only applied to individuals who had culpable knowledge of the 
criminal purposes or acts of the organization, and the IMT interpreted the doctrine through the 
lens of conspiracy. See International Military Tribunal, 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 14 Nov 1945–1 Oct 1946 
500 (1948) (“A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of 
both is co-operation for criminal purposes.”). 
144  See Ambos, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 181–83, citing Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (de 
Gruyter 8th ed 2006) (cited in note 47) (Organisationsherrschaft is “the theory of control of the act 
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preferred solution, the theory of joint or shared intentions, is developed in 
Section IV. All are attempts to dress the original Nuremberg move—the 
concept of criminal organizations—in modern clothing. They are correct insofar 
as they take the criminal group as the starting point of the analysis.  
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE CONTROL THEORY 
Having carefully diagnosed the problems with both conspiracy and JCE, 
we should now turn our attention to co-perpetration. In this Section, I argue 
that while co-perpetration avoids many of the problems associated with JCE, the 
doctrine as applied by the ICC exaggerates the importance of “control” as a 
defining characteristic of joint endeavors, while at the same time undervaluing 
the centrality of the distinctive mental states of the participants in joint criminal 
endeavors. By analyzing a series of hypothetical examples, the following Section 
concludes that intentionality—rather than control—must be the center of any 
doctrine of group criminality. 
A. Co-Perpetration at the ICC 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber offered its own analysis of the Rome Statute’s 
Article 25 in its The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo145 decision.146 The Chief 
Prosecutor declined to plead JCE and instead charged Lubanga under a theory 
of co-perpetration.147 This in itself represented a substantial jurisprudential 
decision on the part of the Office of the Prosecutor. Although the ICTY Trial 
Chamber on a few occasions attempted to push a theory of co-perpetration in 
favor of JCE,148 the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY never once pushed for 
co-perpetration as a mode of liability in place of joint criminal enterprise.149 The 
ICC Pre-trial Chamber concluded that the notion of co-perpetration in Article 
25(3)(a) best described the allegations against Lubanga because, 
                                                                                                                              
by virtue of a hierarchical organisation”) and Friedrich Dencker, Kausalität und Gesamttat (Duncker 
1996) (Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat is “a principle or theory of attribution according to which the 
‘global act’ (the criminal enterprise) constitutes the central object of attribution”). 
145  Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 (cited in note 103). 
146  See id ¶ 337. 
147  However, the Legal Representative of Victims argued to the court that Article 25(3)(a) codified 
joint criminal enterprise. See id ¶ 325. 
148  The most notable example was Prosecutor v Stakić, Case No IT-97-24-T (cited in note 119). For a 
discussion of this case and its subsequent reversal by the Appeals Chamber, see Ohlin, Commentary 
at 739−41 (cited in note 112). See also Héctor Olásolo, Reflections on the Treatment of the Notions of 
Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Stakić Appeal Judgement, 7 Intl Crim L Rev 143, 
143 (2007).  
149  The Office of the Prosecutor did allege on several occasions that defendants were responsible for 
co-perpetrating a joint criminal enterprise. See Stakić, IT-97-24-T ¶ 504 (cited in note 119). 
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the concept of co-perpetration is originally rooted in the idea that when the 
sum of the co-ordinated individual contributions of a plurality of persons 
results in the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, any person 
making a contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the 
contributions of all the others and, as a result, can be considered as a 
principal to the whole crime.150 
The Pre-Trial Chamber started its analysis by considering the various 
doctrines that can be used to distinguish between perpetrators and 
accomplices.151 The traditional common law rule, which the Chamber termed the 
“objective” approach, defined perpetrators as those who committed the actus 
reus of the crime, while supporters behind the scenes were branded as mere 
accomplices.152 This is a counter-intuitive result when the person behind the 
scenes orders the murder and the triggerman is a mere employee.153 The 
alternative is a “subjective” approach, which defines the perpetrator by virtue of 
his or her subjective mental state, that is, his or her intent to commit the 
crime.154 In the case of a collective crime, what defines the perpetrators is their 
shared intent to commit the crime, regardless of their level of objective 
contribution (small or large). The Chamber identified the subjective approach 
with the JCE doctrine applied by the ICTY.155 
The Pre-Trial Chamber swept both of these approaches to the side, 
preferring to chart a third way, co-perpetration, which combined subjective and 
objective elements in a different way. The Chamber based its understanding of 
co-perpetration in the Rome Statute on Roxin’s control theory of perpetration.156 
This view is popular in German criminal law theory and has gained renewed 
currency in international circles as a result of the Lubanga decision.157 The control 
theory of perpetration distinguishes between principals and accessories by asking 
                                                 
150  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 326 (cited in note 103). 
151  See id at ¶¶ 327−32.  
152  See id at ¶ 328. See also Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 654−55 (cited in note 9) (classifying 
theories to distinguish between principal perpetrators and accessories). 
153  For a discussion of the problems with the objective approach, see Ohlin, Commentary at 744 (cited 
in note 112). See also Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 655 (cited in note 9).  
154  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 329 (cited in note 103); Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 
657, citing Stashchynsky, 18 BGHSt 87 (1962) (Ger) (cited in note 9) (German court holding that 
KGB agent was not a principal because he was a mere instrument of his superiors). 
155  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 329 (cited in note 103). 
156  Consider Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft 34 (de Gruyter 6th ed 1994); Fletcher, Rethinking 
at 655–56 (cited in note 9); Stakić, IT-97-24-T at ¶ 440 n 945 (cited in note 119); Lubanga, ICC-
01/04-01/06 at ¶¶ 324 n 414, 348 n 425 (cited in note 103).  
157  For a complete discussion, see Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration in 
the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 6 J Intl Crim Just 471, 478−79 (2008). See 
also Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 123 ¶ 354 (TMC Asser 2005). 
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who has control over the crime in question. If a defendant was in control of the 
criminal act, perhaps by virtue of ordering or soliciting a murder, then the 
defendant is an indirect perpetrator, even if he is not the physical perpetrator of 
the crime in question (that is, he did not pull the trigger).158 The indirect 
perpetrator is indispensable because he controls the endeavor. If the individual 
with the gun is directed to conduct the crime by a military superior, then he has 
no direct control over the crime and is largely dispensable to the endeavor; he 
can be replaced by another soldier who can be ordered to commit the crime. If 
the indirect perpetrator works in tandem at the leadership level with others, then 
the leaders are classified as co-perpetrators because they share joint control over 
the crime. Control over the crime may be exercised through a hierarchical 
organizational structure (for example, Organisationsherrschaft), though there are 
other avenues for exercising control. 
According to the ICC, the objective requirements for co-perpetration are 
the existence of a common plan among the participants and an essential 
contribution to the plan by the defendant.159 The requirement that the 
contribution be essential means that the defendant could have frustrated the 
plan by withdrawing from it, thus establishing his joint control over the 
endeavor. The required mental state for an indirect perpetrator is awareness of his 
or her control over the crime.160 For co-perpetrators, the required mental state is 
awareness of their joint control over a common plan and awareness of their 
essential contribution to it. Since both Lubanga and others had joint control 
over the crime, his participation was best viewed through the lens of co-
perpetration, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber.161 In addition to awareness of 
their control and essential contribution, co-perpetrators must also have the 
intent that the physical perpetrators commit the crime.162 However, the ICC 
completely watered down the intent requirement to the absolute minimum.163 
For purposes of this doctrine, co-perpetrators “intend” the crime if they are 
aware of the risk that the physical perpetrators will commit the offense and the 
co-perpetrators reconcile themselves to this risk or consent to it.164  
Criminal lawyers from common law jurisdictions would hardly describe 
this mental requirement as anything close to intentional or purposeful. At most, 
                                                 
158  See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 655−59 (cited in note 9). 
159  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 ¶ 343 (cited in note 103). 
160  See id ¶ 331. 
161  See id ¶ 341. 
162  See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 178 (TMC Asser 2d ed 2009). 
163  See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 481 (cited in note 157). 
164  See id at 481–82. 
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it is a form of advertent recklessness.165 Criminal lawyers from civil law 
jurisdictions will often refer to this mental requirement as dolus eventualis and 
consider it uncontroversial, but the ICC’s use of the concept here bears scrutiny. 
It is especially problematic because the ICC uses the same concept to conclude 
that the goal of the common plan need not be criminal at all: it is enough for the 
defendant to subjectively reconcile themselves to the risk that their pursuit of 
the (lawful) common plan will entail the perpetration of various crimes by other 
actors.166 The Rome Statute defines acting with “intent” (in relation to a 
consequence) as meaning to “cause [a] consequence” or to be aware that the 
consequence will happen “in the ordinary course of events.”167 The ICC put a 
gloss on this standard by concluding that a defendant’s subjective awareness of a 
substantial risk of the consequence happening was sufficient to meet this 
standard.168 Although this accords with the civil law doctrine of dolus eventualis, it 
is not at all clear that it accords with the meaning of the Rome Statute’s 
requirement of “in the ordinary course of events,” which suggests a higher 
standard than dolus eventualis. The result of the ICC’s control theory approach is 
the combination of awareness of joint control over the crime with an 
intentionality requirement that is so watered down that the control requirement 
appears to be doing all of the heavy lifting in the doctrine. In the case of indirect 
co-perpetrators, what “links” the defendants to each other is the common plan 
or agreement among them; but what links these defendants to the physical 
perpetrators is not the existence of a common plan but rather the defendants’ 
joint control over the perpetrators, either as instruments or through an 
organizational hierarchy. However, the whole point of vicarious liability is the 
doctrinal need to provide a linking principle between the physical perpetrators of 
the crime and the defendants, and in the case of indirect co-perpetrators, the 
control criterion allegedly provides that link. 
The second problem with the doctrine of co-perpetration is that it seems 
to imply a model of cooperation among a small number of individuals; the 
paradigmatic version of co-perpetration is cooperation between two individuals 
to complete a crime.169 The Rome Statute’s formulation of liability for crimes 
“commit[ted] . . . jointly with another” suggests a crime committed by two 
                                                 
165  See Cassese, International Criminal Law at 200–01 (cited in note 25) (“the test is . . . whether a man 
of reasonable prudence would have forecast that conduct, under the circumstances prevailing at 
the time”). 
166  See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 482 (cited in note 157). 
167  See Rome Statute, Art 30(2)(b) (cited in note 61). 
168  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 ¶ 352 (cited in note 103). See also Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 
481 (cited in note 157). 
169  See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 638 (cited in note 9). 
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persons;170 the provision does not say “committed jointly with others.” 
International crimes, by contrast, are often committed by a great plurality of 
persons committed to a joint cause, and it is unclear whether describing such 
large-scale conspiracies as examples of co-perpetration is an accurate reflection 
of the facts on the ground. That being said, Roxin’s theory of indirect 
perpetration through an organizational hierarchy nicely captures the relationship 
between a discrete number of leaders in a vast conspiracy, but it is unclear if the 
framers of the Rome Statute had this picture in mind when they crafted Article 
25(3)(a) and its reference to “jointly with another.” Such large-scale 
organizational criminality seems more suited to Article 25(3)(d)—contributions 
to a group endeavor—which the ICC has so far declined to utilize.  
B. A New Geography of Collective Action 
Replacing JCE with the control theory of perpetration requires further 
scrutiny. We should conduct an independent and first order analysis of the 
criminality of group actors and decide what type of theory would best describe 
their culpability. A reactionary acceptance of the control theory would be just as 
unwise as blind acceptance of JCE. My own sense is that the control theory’s 
attempt to move away from the subjective mental state of the perpetrators—and 
the idea of joint or shared intentions—is not ideal. Individuals often combine 
their efforts in order to achieve collective goals and, in so doing, demonstrate a 
particular intentional state that demonstrates their individual commitment to a 
joint activity.171 Replacing this mental state with “awareness” of the 
circumstances of joint control and a watered-down intent requirement may have 
unintended consequences, which this Section will now explore. Although it is 
clear from Section III that the doctrine of JCE was deeply problematic, it is 
unclear whether the control theory, by sidestepping shared intentions, accurately 
responds to the particular problems in the doctrine. Ironically, it may be the case 
that the implicit idea of joint intentions was the one part of the JCE doctrine 
that ought to be retained. 
In order to understand fully the mental states of individuals involved in 
group criminality, as well as their legal significance for criminal culpability, it 
would be best to consider a series of hypotheticals involving group action. 
Consider the following: 
                                                 
170  See Rome Statute, Art 25(3)(a) (cited in note 61). 
171  See Section V. 
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1. The Love Parade. 
A large techno music festival is being held outdoors in an industrial city in 
Germany.172 The crowd (hundreds of thousands of individuals) quickly exceeds 
the capacity of the outdoor location where the music festival is being held. The 
main entrance to the festival is a small pedestrian tunnel that creates a bottleneck 
situation.173 People continue to stream into the tunnel to get to the concert, but 
there is no room on the other side for them. At the same time, individuals inside 
the concert start to use the tunnel as an exit. People start to panic as they realize 
that there is not enough room in the tunnel to accommodate everyone. With 
people continuing to push from both sides of the narrow tunnel, those inside 
the tunnel become trapped with nowhere to move. More than twenty 
concertgoers are crushed to death by the surging crowd.174 
2. Essen Lynching. 
Three British pilots are captured in the German town of Essen during 
World War II.175 A German officer orders a subordinate to transport the British 
POWs to a Luftwaffe post where they can be interrogated.176 However, at the 
time of departure, the German officer issues the following additional order: the 
escort should not interfere with any civilians who might attack the prisoners.177 
The command was issued in public so that it could be heard not just by the 
escort but also by a crowd that had gathered in the vicinity.178 As the POWs 
were marched down the streets of Essen, they were beaten by a growing crowd 
and eventually thrown over a bridge. One of the POWs died instantly after the 
fall from the bridge and the other two POWs were finished off by shots fired 
from the crowd and a final round of beatings.179 
                                                 
172  The example is based on the stampede that recently occurred in Duisburg, Germany. See Judy 
Dempsey, Stampede at German Music Festival Kills 18, NY Times (July 24, 2010).  
173  See id. 
174  See Judy Dempsey, Deadly German Stampede Gets Its Villain, NY Times (July 30, 2010). 
175  The example is based on the Essen Lynching Case at 91 (cited in note 68). See also Tadić, IT-94-1-A 
¶¶ 207–09 (cited in note 1) (citing Essen Lynching Case). 
176  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 207 (cited in note 1). 
177  Id.  
178  Id.  
179  Id.  
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3. The Concentration Camp.  
Three military officers are all working as guards in a Concentration Camp 
in the former Yugoslavia.180 The detention camp is specifically designed to serve 
as a system of mistreatment against the civilians who are detained there. Crimes, 
including murder, torture, and rape, are being systematically committed against 
the civilians who live in the camp. The officers are all aware of the illegal nature 
of the camp and the officers all have the general intent to support the systemic 
mistreatment of the civilians in the camp by working as guards there.181 One of 
the officers engages in the torture and rape of one of the civilian detainees. The 
other two officers do not directly help commit this particular act, nor are they 
aware of this particular crime when it occurs. 
4. The Deportation. 
A unit of soldiers is engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing in an 
attempt to remove all members of an ethnic minority from the region.182 The 
soldiers forcibly remove fifty civilians from their homes simply because of their 
ethnicity and do not allow them to take any of their possessions with them. The 
soldiers agree amongst themselves that they will drive the civilians to a local train 
station, where a freight train is waiting to deport them, like cattle, to another 
region. The result will be an ethnically homogenous homeland (or at least 
progress towards that goal). However, when the detainees arrive at the train 
station, one of the soldiers decides that he prefers to kill the civilians instead of 
simply deporting them. He shoots all of them. 
                                                 
180  The classic concentration camp precedent is Dachau Concentration Camp, 11 Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals 5 (UNWCC 1947). The most significant concentration camp case to come out of 
the ICTY is the Čelebići Camp Case. See Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić, Landžo (Čelebići Camp Case), 
Case No IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 195–96 (ICTY T Ch Nov 16, 1998).  
181  See, for example, Čelebići Camp Case, IT-96-21-T ¶¶ 325−26 (cited in note 180) (mens rea required 
for individual criminal responsibility for degrees of involvement in a crime is “awareness of the 
act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, 
ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting the commission of a crime.”); Tadić, IT-94-
1-A ¶ 202 (cited in note 1). See also Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 Others (Belsen), British Military 
Court, Luneberg, Germany, 17 Sept−17 Nov, 1945, 2 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 
(UNWCC 1947) (forty-five staff of Belsen or Auschwitz concentration camps and others in 
positions of authority accused of committing murders individually and of having knowingly 
participated in a common plan to operate a system of ill-treatment and murder in these camps).  
182  See Stakić, IT-97-24-A ¶ 278 (cited in note 102) (Appeals Chamber’s view of the actus reus and 
mens rea of the offence of deportation). For a full discussion of deportation as a crime against 
humanity, see Robert Cryer, et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 249−50 
(Cambridge 2d ed 2010) (specifically discussing ICTY case law regarding deportation in the 
context of ethnic cleansing). 
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5. Attack Against Civilians. 
A unit of twelve soldiers is ordered to seize a town that is located along a 
strategic roadway. By seizing the town, including its tall buildings, the soldiers 
will be able to locate and fire upon any enemy soldiers who drive down the 
roadway. There are many civilians living in the town. Instead of evacuating and 
detaining the unarmed civilians, the soldiers decide to simply kill all of them. The 
soldiers agree that, in order to achieve this result, each of them will go into a 
building and kill any occupants that they find there.  
What is the common factor among each of these hypotheticals? All of 
them involve collective action, although the degree of integration, the level of 
agreement, and the mental state of the participants are different in each case. To 
start, consider the easiest case, the Attack Against Civilians. In that case, the 
soldiers agree to commit the crime together. What is distinctive about the 
scenario is that the outcome would be impossible—or perhaps difficult—for 
each individual to achieve on his or her own. Consequently, the individuals agree 
on a collective course of action. So each individual not only has the intention to 
pursue his own particular course of action, but each individual understands and 
intends for the other individuals to fulfill their part of the program as well. One 
can infer this intentional state—intending to commit one’s own act and 
intending that others do similarly—on the basis of their shared commitment to 
the overall outcome, and the fact that the outcome is not achievable without this 
level of collective coordination. Arguably, this is the easiest case to justify 
vicarious liability for the actions of co-participants, because each individual has 
the mental state (intention) that grounds not only his own action but also the 
actions of his co-participants. 
Contrast that situation with the most difficult hypothetical—the Love 
Parade example. In that case, the individuals at each end of the tunnel have a 
rather simple intention: to use the tunnel as a means of egress. When panic 
begins to set in and the individuals involved realize that there is a danger, each 
simply has an intention to escape the chaos in order to survive.183 Taken 
together, the consequence of so many individuals acting on their individual 
intentions produces a deadly collective result: the crowd itself becomes a surging 
mass that ends up killing twenty individuals. However, the crucial distinguishing 
factor of the Love Parade crush, and others like it, is the attitude of each 
individual about the actions of the others. Although each individual intends to 
get through the tunnel, he or she does not intend for the others to do the same. 
This distinguishes the Love Parade crowd from the Attack Against the Civilians. 
In fact, each individual concertgoer would probably prefer that the others refrain 
                                                 
183  See Dempsey, Stampede at 1 (cited in note 172). 
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from going through the tunnel in order to make it easier for him or her to pass 
through. Also, none of the concertgoers wants anyone to die. So what produces 
the deadly result is the confluence of so many concertgoers with individual 
intentions that result in a completely uncoordinated result. This notion of an 
uncoordinated result is significant, because a stampede is really just a collective 
action problem like the Prisoners’ Dilemma.184 If the concertgoers could have 
coordinated their behavior properly, they could have exited the concert grounds 
in a safe and orderly fashion. But once the crowd started to panic, each 
individual was concerned that he or she might get trapped by the surging crowd, 
so each individual decided to push to get out in order to save himself or herself. 
Of course, if each individual knew for certain that the other concertgoers would 
forgo pushing, there would be no need for him or her to push as well in an 
attempt to escape. But since there was no way of enforcing this norm, each 
individual had to engage in egoistic self-preservation and try to push his or her 
way out of the crowd, even if this helped create the very collective problem that 
caused the stampede. The problem of norm enforcement in such situations is 
particularly acute because even police officers screaming at people to stop will 
do nothing to change the people’s self-interested behavior if they risk death or 
injury when the rest of the crowd ignores the police officers’ commands. And, 
given that the rest of the crowd is in the exact same situation, this guarantees 
that no one will listen to the police officers. The result is a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
where everyone defects.185 
This can be distinguished from the more coordinated result of the crowd 
behavior in the Essen Lynching example. In that scenario, the members of the 
crowd hear the order of German officer suggesting that it might be a good idea 
if the POWs were to meet a violent end.186 The crowd then responds by beating 
                                                 
184  But see Jeff Wise, When Crowds Panic, NY Times Blog (Aug 3, 2010), online at 
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/when-crowds-panic/ (visited Oct 24, 2010) 
(“[T]he most perplexing form of tragedy: one that unfolds entirely as a result of the normal 
psychology of healthy human beings. When crowds reach a critical density, they automatically 
become vulnerable to a contagion of blind fear that overwhelms any attempt at rational 
behavior[.]”). 
185  See Roger Brown, Social Psychology 738−44 (The Free Press 1965) (stampede as n-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 
Am J Soc 481, 490 (1985) (citing Roger Brown’s n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma). 
186  Compare with Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 209 (cited in note 1) (concluding that “not all of them intended 
to kill but all intended to participate in the unlawful ill-treatment of the prisoners of war”). It is 
not clear whether this is a legitimate inference from the Essen Lynching case. The court appeared to 
hold all of the individuals vicariously liable regardless of whether they had fired a shot or 
delivered one of the fatal blows, though this does not entail the conclusion that defendants were 
convicted in the absence of an intent to kill. See especially id ¶ 209 n 259 (discussing civilians, 
including Boddenberg, who were convicted in light of the fact that the motives of the crowd 
against the airmen “were deadly”). 
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the POWs. Each individual clearly has the intention to administer each 
individual blow.187 But what is the attitude of each individual regarding the 
activities of the rest of the crowd? Although no advance coordination or 
deliberate planning sessions are conducted, it is possible to infer that each 
member of the mob intended for the rest of the mob to engage in the beating as 
well.188 Unlike the Love Parade example where the collective violence is the 
unfortunate result of uncoordinated behavior, the collective violence in Essen 
Lynching is the deliberate result of coordinated behavior. Each member of the 
crowd intends to hit the POWs and similarly intends for the rest of the crowd to 
do the same, with full knowledge that together they might achieve a result that 
individually would be impossible to achieve: killing the captives.189 It is 
important to realize that in such situations, the intention of each individual 
regarding the actions of the crowd arises somewhat spontaneously, without prior 
deliberation, but this does not mean that there is no intention or coordination at 
all. Spontaneous and intentional coordination should not be confused with no 
coordination at all. That is the difference between the Love Parade example and 
Essen Lynching. 
Consider now the Concentration Camp example. This hypothetical sits in 
the middle between the Love Parade example and the Attack Against the 
Civilians. Each individual has the intention to work as a guard at the camp and 
in so doing has the intention to further the system of mistreatment that the 
camp represents. But each guard’s attitude about the work of the others is a little 
more complicated. Each guard intends that the other guards also work to keep 
the system of mistreatment functioning, since each knows that it would be 
impossible to run such a system without the collective coordination of many 
guards who were similarly inclined. It would be literally impossible for a single 
individual to operate such a facility alone. However, it is probably not the case 
that the two guards intend for the third guard to commit that particular act of 
torture and rape.190 This places the intentions of the guard in a liminal position 
                                                 
187  This issue is discussed in Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by 
Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J Intl Crim Just 606, 616 (2004). 
188  See id (“The prosecution in Essen Lynching, as the Appeals Chamber noted [in Tadić], specifically 
stated that if the accused had the intent to kill, then they would be guilty of murder; if they had no 
such intent, then they could still be convicted of manslaughter. The accused were convicted of 
murder, implying that the court concluded that they all indeed intended the airmen to die.”). 
189  For another example of individual intent for the group to commit the act, see Rod Nordland, In 
Bold Display, Taliban Order Stoning Deaths, NY Times (Aug 16, 2010) (execution where 200 villagers 
participated by throwing stones and were described as “festive” and “cheering”). 
190  See, for example, Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-A ¶ 184 (cited in note 116) (“The Trial Chamber found that 
Kvočka had actively contributed to the everyday functioning and maintenance of the camp and, 
through his participation, enabled the camp to continue unabated its insidious policies and 
practices, and is thus criminally responsible for the crimes committed as part of the joint criminal 
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between the two other hypotheticals. It is perhaps for this reason that the ICTY 
in Tadić designated an entirely separate doctrinal category, JCE II, for these 
cases.191 Under the rule announced in Tadić, a concentration camp guard is 
vicariously liable for the actions of other guards if the defendant has the “intent 
to further the common concerted design to ill-treat inmates.”192 The defendant 
need not have the intent for the specific underlying criminal act charged in the 
indictment. So, in the case of the Concentration Camp example, the two prison 
guards would be convicted of war crimes for the torture and rape committed by 
the third guard. The Tadić court justified this rule by appeal to World War II 
precedent, and in particular the Dachau Concentration Camp case, although the 
ruling is a bit thin on a doctrinal theory to explain the result.193 
The most tenuous example is the Deportation hypothetical. In that case, 
the soldiers all have the individual intent to cooperate on the deportation. And 
each individual soldier intends for the other soldiers to complete their part in the 
plan as well. So there is a mutually reinforcing network of reciprocal intentions. 
However, the rogue soldier also has an intention that the others do not share: 
the intent to murder the civilians. The attitude of the other soldiers regarding 
this action might run the gamut from regret to a form of passive acquiescence.194 
In any event, they clearly do not intend for the rogue soldier to take this action. 
The most that can be said is that they were negligent or reckless for participating 
in a joint criminal endeavor with a member whose capacity for rogue behavior 
and straying from the criminal plan was arguably reasonably foreseeable. Under 
both common law conspiracy doctrine and JCE doctrine, this recklessness 
provides the justification for vicarious liability for actions that fall outside the 
scope of the original criminal plan.195 
                                                                                                                              
enterprise.”); Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajišnik, Case No IT-00-39/40, Judgment, ¶ 884 (ICTY T Ch I 
Sept 27, 2006) (“[P]ersons in a criminal enterprise must be shown to act together, or in concert 
with each other, in the implementation of a common objective, if they are to share responsibility 
for the crimes committed through the JCE[.]”). 
191  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 202 (cited in note 1). 
192  See id ¶ 203. 
193  See id ¶ 203 n 250. 
194  At the most extreme end of the spectrum, one might describe the attitude of the soldiers as that 
of dolus eventualis. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 445–49 (cited in note 9). But see Fletcher 
and Ohlin, 3 J Intl Crim Just at 554 (cited in note 107) (“If the purpose of an armed band is to rid 
an area of potential military opponents and they know that some people will die as a result, their 
attitude is not necessarily dolus eventualis. Their killing is dolus only if they realize that specific 
people will die, approve and desire this result in their hearts, and decide to continue with their 
action.”). 
195  See Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Cal L Rev 75, 164 (2005) 
(discussing mixed US circuit court reactions to charges under statute for providing material 
support or resources to an organization designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” without a 
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The co-perpetration theory applied by the ICC tends to analyze all of the 
following hypotheticals under the rubric of control.196 According to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s analysis,  
[t]he notion underpinning this third approach is that principals to a crime 
are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of 
the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the 
scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they 
decide whether and how the offence will be committed.197 
Fair enough. However, the required elements applied by the ICC to co-
perpetrators provide confusing guidance. The objective elements include a 
common plan and an essential contribution to it.198 The subjective elements 
include intent (dolus eventualis) that the crime be committed and awareness of 
their joint control over the crime.199 So the control theory would provide the 
following answers to the hypotheticals. In the case of the Attack Against the 
Civilians, the soldiers are all guilty as co-perpetrators of the entire war crime 
because each one played an essential role in the crime and exercised joint control 
over the operation. In the case of the Love Parade stampede, it is difficult to 
determine whether there is a common plan and whether each individual’s 
contribution is to be considered essential. First, the ICC’s control theory does 
not require a common criminal goal; it allows prosecution for a non-criminal goal 
that creates a substantial risk of criminal consequences. As for judging the 
“essentiality” of the contribution, the doctrine devolves into counterfactual 
analysis.200 On the one hand, each individual’s role was non-essential because 
“but for” his or her conduct, the stampede would surely still have occurred in 
almost exactly the same way. On the other hand, this produces a paradoxical 
answer: the same thing could be answered about each defendant at which point 
the stampede would certainly not have happened. As for the criterion of joint 
control and awareness of control, the answer is complicated. In one sense, each 
concertgoer exercised joint control over the result by virtue of his or her actions 
that caused the result; had the concertgoers done otherwise, the stampede would 
not have occurred, thus implying a level of mutual control. On the other hand, 
the collective result was completely uncoordinated, thus suggesting a complete lack 
of meaningful control over the result. Herein lies the difficulty: the lack of 
                                                                                                                              
scienter requirement); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocities, 105 
Colum L Rev 1751, 1785–86 (2005) (discussing the resemblance between JCE III and Pinkerton 
and felony murder). 
196  See, for example, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 ¶ 322 (cited in note 103). 
197  Id ¶ 330. 
198  See id ¶¶ 343, 346. 
199  See id ¶¶ 331, 366. 
200  See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 480 (cited in note 157). 
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coordination stems from the lack of a common criminal plan. However, the 
ICC’s control theory does not require that the common plan have a criminal 
goal, but only that the co-perpetrators realize the substantial risk of criminal 
consequences. 
Consider now the Essen Lynching example. Although there is joint activity 
in this case (including a spontaneous plan to lynch the airmen), we again run into 
the same ambiguity over whether each individual punch from a member of the 
crowd is considered essential activity. In one sense the actions of the crowd 
appear to be coordinated because each realizes that he or she is participating in a 
lynching, but the issue of control again appears elusive. One might resolve the 
anxiety here by declaring that the German officer who suggested to the crowd 
that they should lynch the airmen is the real perpetrator of the crime; he retained 
control over the crime because he could have refrained from issuing the order in 
the first place—and could have intervened and dispersed the crowd when it 
started. While his culpability is clear under the control theory, in situations where 
the top level actor is missing (The Love Parade example), the question of control 
is confusing. 
The Concentration Camp and the Deportation examples are also difficult 
to resolve. Under the control theory, the camp guards might be considered as 
jointly in control because they exercise coordinated authority over the inmates. 
Moreover they are clearly aware of the circumstances of their coordinated 
contributions and their joint control over the prison. On the other hand, they 
are in the middle of the organizational hierarchy, and perhaps ultimate control 
rests with the commandant of the prison, as in the Essen Lynching example.201 
The Commandant presumably has the authority to relieve a camp guard of his 
duty and replace him with another soldier. Is this enough to conclude that the 
guard is not in joint control over the crime?202 The Deportation case is the one 
example where a strict version of the control theory could offer a simple and 
elegant answer: none of the soldiers has control over the rogue soldier who 
strays from the pre-arranged criminal plan. Although each is guilty of co-
                                                 
201  For example, the commandant of the notorious Tuol Sleng prison was one of the first to be 
indicted and then stand trial at the ECCC. See Kaing Guek Eav (Duch Case), Case No 001/18-07-
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minus ten years for time served and five years for illegal detention). 
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concrete criminal plan,” so that the relevant question is not whether the crime would have 
happened at all but rather whether the crime would have still happened in the same way as agreed 
to by the participants. See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 480 (cited in note 157). Of course, this 
requires an account of the level of specificity in the plan. The same plan might be described in 
different ways—a thick version that includes many specific details, a thin version that simply 
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of specificity along the spectrum between the thin and thick versions. 
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perpetrating the war crime of deportation (and possibly a crime against humanity 
for persecution), the only soldier guilty of murder as a war crime is the rogue 
soldier. However, the ICC’s expansive version of the control theory left the door 
open for vicarious liability provided that the other soldiers were aware “of the 
substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions would result in the 
realization of the objective elements of the crime . . . [and decided] to carry out 
his or her actions or omissions despite such awareness.”203 Applied to the 
current facts, this liability based on dolus eventualis would attach if the other 
soldiers understood that there was a substantial likelihood that the plan would 
result in the killing of the deportees by the rogue soldier and continued with the 
plan nevertheless.204 This use of dolus eventualis simply rehashes the JCE III 
standard of “reasonably foreseeable.”205  
The control theory cobbles together a patchwork of requirements but 
never achieves a convincing account of group criminality. Although control is 
relevant for culpability, it is not the central element. By defining the mental 
element of the co-perpetrator as awareness joint control combined with a 
watered down intent requirement, the doctrine effectively moves the mental 
element to the background in favor of the objective element.206 Control becomes 
the sine qua non of the doctrine. True, this result is consistent with the PTC’s 
motivation in adopting the control theory in the first place—avoiding the 
subjective approach embodied by JCE—but one wonders whether the result 
adequately captures the culpable mental state of the participants of collective 
crimes.  
The ICC’s control theory deemphasizes and undervalues the joint intention 
of the participants—no adequate theory of vicarious liability in international 
criminal law can be complete without a thorough understanding of the mental 
attitude of each participant to the participation of his colleagues. The basic 
structure of that answer must involve an appropriate mapping, at the 
philosophical level, of an individual’s intentional commitment to the group 
endeavor. By drawing on the philosophical literature on shared intentions, the 
following section is devoted to briefly explaining that account and 
                                                 
203  Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 ¶ 353 (cited in note 103). 
204  See id ¶ 352. 
205  See Fletcher and Ohlin, 3 J Intl Crim Just at 554 (cited in note 107) (arguing that dolus eventualis 
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demonstrating its centrality in resolving these questions. Although a theory of 
shared intentions does not resolve every question of culpability raised by the 
hypotheticals in the previous section, the following section will demonstrate that 
a satisfactory ICL doctrine of collective participation cannot be constructed 
without one. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. 
V. A THEORY OF JOINT INTENTIONS 
This section draws heavily on the work of Michael Bratman, who has 
offered the most philosophically convincing treatment of the matter of shared 
intentions.207 John Searle and Raimo Tuomolo have also pursued similar 
accounts, which they called collective intentions and we-intentions.208 For the 
most part, the philosophical differences between these theories will be of only 
partial concern to our analysis. True, it is important to get the theoretical details 
correct. But before we do that, we must demonstrate that the very idea of group 
intentionality is the relevant subject to discuss. Whether you call it a shared or 
joint intention, a collective intention, or a we-intention does not matter yet. We 
start with the definition offered by Bratman not because I am committed to its 
correctness, but rather because it offers the most concise and elegant 
formulation from which to start the analysis.209 
A. The Shared Intention Thesis 
In numerous essays, Bratman defends what he calls the Shared Intention 
Thesis (SI thesis).210 It consists of the following propositions: 
We intend to J [joint activity] if and only if: 
(1) (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 
(2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of (1)(a), (1)(b), and 
meshing subplans of (1)(a) and (1)(b); you intend that we J in accordance 
with and because of (1)(a), (1)(b), and meshing subplans of (1)(a) and (1)(b). 
(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge between us.211 
                                                 
207  See, for example, Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency 
93−129 (Cambridge 1999). 
208  For a general discussion, see John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in Philip R. Cohen, 
Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack, eds, Intentions in Communication 401 (MIT 1990); Raimo 
Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller, We-Intentions, 53 Phil Studies 367 (1988). 
209  Bratman’s theory is arguably the most influential theory of joint intentions and has been widely 
cited in the legal field (although not in international criminal law). See, for example, Coleman, The 
Practice of Principle at 96−99 (cited in note 3). 
210  See Bratman, Faces at 131 (cited in note 207). 
211  Id. 
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Although the SI thesis sounds technical, it can be parsed rather simply. 
Step 1 codifies the requirement that a shared intention is simply a collection of 
two (or more) individual intentions that are related in the right way. The required 
relationship is then explained in Steps 2 and 3. The individual intentions referred 
to in Step 1 are a very specific kind of intention, which is the intention that you 
and I both engage in an activity together.212 
The relationship between the intentions that is codified in Step 2 involves 
the reciprocal and coordinated nature of the intentions.213 In other words, the 
individuals do not simply intend for the cooperation to happen and then blindly 
hope that it comes to pass.214 Rather, each individual desires that the group 
commit the action in full knowledge that the other individual so desires as 
well.215 That is the first half of Step 2. The second half of Step 2 involves the 
meshing of subplans, or the coordination for how the activity will be 
conducted.216 This does not necessarily mean that all possible subplans will be 
coordinated, but simply that each individual has an expectation that they will 
plan with the others how to carry out the activity, and it is within the context of 
this expectation that each individual has the intention that the group will 
conduct the activity.217 Finally, Step 3 simply states that each member will be 
aware of the reciprocal nature of the intentions.218 
Bratman’s preferred example is the painting of a house by two 
individuals.219 Suppose an individual wants to paint a house and starts in the 
front. As it happens, a second individual also wants to paint the house and starts 
from the back. Since neither is aware of the other, we could not conclude that 
they have a shared intention to paint the house.220 Any coordination here is 
completely accidental. Suppose then that the individual in the front of the house 
is aware of the activity of the second individual, but not vice versa. This would 
also not constitute a joint intention to paint the house. Third, consider a 
situation where both are aware of the existence of the other painter, but neither 
is doing the painting in accordance with—and because of—the other painter. 
(Such indifference might be strange, but not impossible). This leaves us with the 
possibility that each one is aware of the other painter and in fact does the 
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painting in full expectation that the other painter is doing the same from the 
opposite end. This, in fact, is quite easy to imagine where two individuals are 
committed to pursuing a project efficiently. However, what if the painter in the 
front starts painting in blue and the painter in back starts painting in red, and 
each one is painting the house with the intention that it be fully painted in the 
color that they were painting? In this situation, there would not be a joint 
intention either. A joint intention arises where there is some minimal planning 
activity such that each individual intends that the group commit the action 
because they have coordinated subplans that dictate how the action is going to 
be carried out.221 Then and only then can we conclude that two individuals 
exhibit a shared intention to commit a particular action. 
Several immediate observations can be drawn from this account. First, this 
account is highly individualistic. The basic building blocks of the account are 
individuals and their individual intentions, and the particular relationship 
between those intentions. There is nothing overly metaphysical or mystical about 
the concepts being deployed here.222 There is no reference to corporate entities 
or group minds.223 Indeed, if there is any fault here, it may be that the account is 
overly individualistic. Given that the account is so entirely individualistic, how 
does it manage to yield an account of a collective intention? The answer lays in the 
heavy use and deployment of the concept of planning.224 Although many agents 
(including some animals) may have the capacity to form some kind of mental 
intention, only planning agents are capable of interacting with each other in a 
way that can yield a collective intention.225 This is based on the full blown 
reciprocal nature of how planning agents interact with each other. Planning 
agents recognize each other as being uniquely capable of engaging in cooperative 
behavior, through the process of deliberation regarding means, in a way that 
results in either the full or partial meshing of subplans.226 Taken together, this 
yields a shared intention. 
It does not matter (or it should not matter) what you call it. But one could 
offer a theory of shared intentions that is far less individualistic and far more 
                                                 
221  See id at 95–98. 
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collectivist. Searle, for example, argues that collective intentions of the type 
explained by Bratman are irreducible to their individual components.227 By this 
he means that collective intentionality is not wholly reducible to individual 
intentions. His argument for the irreducibility of collective intentions stems from 
a simple intuition. A thoroughly individualistic account of collective intentions is 
only possible because it makes reference to cooperation.228 This much is 
undeniable. The house painters only exhibit a collective intention to paint the 
house when there is some indication that they believe and intend that they will 
cooperate in the house-painting project. Without this level of cooperation, one 
simply has two people individually painting a house with two separate individual 
intentions to paint the house. The reference to cooperation, though, may be 
problematic. How ought one understand the concept of cooperation? 
Presumably it involves at least two individuals who work together to achieve a 
particular outcome. The “working together” is a process that is not accidental, 
but rather is intentionally desired by the individuals who are cooperating 
together. This is the very definition of cooperation. If this is the right 
understanding of cooperation, the appeal to cooperation is indeed problematic 
because it renders the entire account viciously circular.229 The account of joint 
intentions is only rendered intelligible as an individualistic account because of its 
implicit appeal to the concept of cooperation.  
But cooperation already has the notion of a collective intention imbedded 
within it.230 So we are left with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either one includes 
cooperation in the formula and risks circularity, or one excludes cooperation 
from the formula and in the process leaves the account hopelessly underbroad. 
Neither alternative is particularly attractive. It suggests that collective intentions 
may not be easily reducible to individual intentions. As Searle puts it, they are a 
“primitive phenomenon.”231 
We need not resolve the problem here. Although I’m inclined to favor the 
irreducibility thesis, we are not absolutely required to resolve the philosophical 
debate in order to insist that some coherent theory of joint or shared intentions 
is necessary to ground an ICL doctrine for vicarious liability. I will rest content if 
I can demonstrate that a theory of joint intentions is required to ground the 
doctrine, without necessarily flushing out every last detail of the theory. Nor 
does this incompleteness render the theory suspect. It simply represents a 
promissory note that some less doctrinal aspects of the theory require future 
                                                 
227  Searle, Collective Intentions at 404 (cited in note 208). 
228  See id at 406. 
229  See id at 405. 
230  See Searle, Collective Intentions at 405 (cited in note 208).  
231  Id (defining these intentions as “primitive phenomenon” in the sense that they are irreducible). 
Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes Ohlin 
Winter 2011 739 
resolution. To confront them directly at this stage of the argument would risk 
entropy. 
B. Planning, Cooperation, and Deliberation 
Before continuing, it is necessary to cash out what we mean by planning 
and cooperation. What does this entail? On these two issues, my account departs 
from the specifics of Bratman’s theory. Bratman is correct that all human agents 
are planning agents in the sense that human agents naturally engage in long term 
planning that requires thinking about how to complete complex projects and 
how the sub-units of those projects intermingle with each other.232 This kind of 
planning implies rational deliberation, or the process of thinking about which 
projects to prioritize and which avenues to pursue as a means of achieving them. 
This process of planning and deliberation can be done individually, in the case of 
individual action, or collectively, in the case of cooperative projects. 
Coordination often involves deliberation about how the group will commit 
the crime. International crimes often exhibit this type of behavior where a group 
of individuals engage in collective deliberation in pursuit of a common criminal 
endeavor. It is this participation in the collective endeavor that is sufficient to 
generate individual culpability (on the basis of the shared intention of the group 
to commit the crime). One sees this, for example, in what prosecutors at the 
ICTY used to refer to as a horizontal JCE to commit war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.233 In such cases a small cadre of military or political leaders, or 
both, conspire together to pursue a joint criminal plan. Their shared intention to 
commit the crime suggests a doctrinal avenue for grounding vicarious liability 
for the actions of other members of the group who do not commit the actus 
reus but nonetheless identify with the result by virtue of their desire to see it 
succeed. 
Planning and deliberation in the context of cooperative behavior have very 
particular characteristics. Two characteristics that I have previously identified are 
particularly relevant: pooling information and shared decision-making.234 In the 
case of pooling information, individuals who make up the ground floor of the 
operation share relevant information with the decision-makers. This is a 
frequent occurrence in the military context where information is sent up the 
chain of command. Such groups are often vertically organized with decision-
making concentrated at the top and information gathering concentrated at the 
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bottom by the rank and file.235 Furthermore, such groups are often loosely knit 
conspiracies with imperfect or infrequent coordination of behavior.236 
Cases involving shared decision-making are slightly different. In such 
situations, individuals engage in reason-giving and reason-taking behavior that 
results in a collective decision. In some cases, the organizational structure of the 
group concentrates decision-making power in a limited group of individuals or 
even in a single leader; in rare cases, the organizational structure contemplates 
democratic decision-making. But regardless of the procedure adopted for 
making final decisions, the group employs shared rationality for engaging in 
collective deliberation. Not only does the group consider appropriate goals, it 
considers how to achieve them with a plan. When its plan develops 
contradictions or inconsistencies that frustrate its goals, it seeks to resolve 
them.237 
There is a clear link between deliberation and joint intentions. Consider 
each individual’s personal attitude regarding the group’s endeavor. By engaging 
in some form of collective deliberation about how to go about achieving a group 
goal, the individuals in the group must, by logical necessity, have a shared 
intention that the crime be committed. Otherwise the collective deliberation fails 
to get off the ground. Bratman puts the point in terms of “meshing” of 
subplans, so that two individuals painting a house make some allowance for how 
and with what color they will do the painting.238 He describes this process using 
the language of cooperation, although as Searle rightly points out, the content of 
the concept of cooperation remains a bit elusive.239 
In previous articles I have explored the collective rationality that emerges 
from such group deliberations.240 In particular, I argued that shared decision-
making can generate collective rationality that overlaps with individual 
rationality.241 In these cases, the rationality of the group is not wholly reducible 
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to the rationality of the individual. As the recent literature on the Doctrinal 
Paradox makes clear, group behavior must be analyzed at the group level in 
order to make sense of it.242 The process of collective deliberation encourages 
participants in the group to seek overall rational unity among the entire group; 
indeed, the individuals are each committed to achieving this rational unity 
among the group. Contradictions in the group’s plan are viewed as problems 
that demand resolution. Whether the group is able to resolve such 
contradictions is an entirely different matter; it is undeniable that the group 
views conflicting courses of action as contradictions that ought to be resolved if 
possible. 
But what of the Essen Lynching example? In that case, the group of 
civilians attacks the British airmen with little or no time to engage in the process 
of collective decision-making. The group’s actions are spontaneous. However, 
this is not to say that its actions are uncoordinated. The process of lynching 
creates an instantaneous coordination, where each individual plays his part in the 
overall endeavor. But when the endeavor is lynching, each individual in the mob 
plays the exact same role: hitting the victims. So the collective action is parsed 
into smaller component parts, although each part is the same. There are no 
differentiated subplans. A public stoning happens in the exact same way. 
Everybody just picks up a stone and throws it. 
The question is whether it is correct to say that the participants in Essen 
Lynching have a joint intention for the group to lynch the airmen, even though 
there is insufficient opportunity for deliberation. One possibility is to take the 
lack of deliberation as evidence for lack of cooperation and therefore a lack of a 
joint intention. Under the joint intentions theory, this would counsel against 
applying vicarious liability to the participants. A second possibility is to conclude 
that deliberation has little to do with cooperative behavior, since cooperative 
behavior is possible in its absence. If this is correct, then our account of 
cooperation and planning stands in need of revision. 
The participants in the Essen Lynching example are not just acting 
individually without regard for each other. There is a difference, after all, 
between the Essen Lynching and the Love Parade. The success of the endeavor 
would be impossible without the simultaneous and coordinated activity of the 
crowd. So cooperative activity is possible without deliberation.  
This suggests that cooperation can vary by degree. In cases involving 
instantaneous cooperation to commit a simple task (such as a lynching), no 
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deliberation is required. As the complexity of the task increases, the rational 
relationship between members of the group may change as well. Cooperation 
may take the form of deliberation, which imposes a unique rational structure to 
the group. The demand for overall rational unity will cause the group to pool 
information and stick to a particular decision-making structure. This is a form of 
collective reason. 
The important point is that not all cases of joint intentions will produce 
collective reason. The Essen Lynching is the perfect example; the participants 
jointly intend for the group to kill the airmen, but the group fails to engage in 
rational deliberation. The question is whether vicarious liability for acts within 
the scope of the criminal plan should attach to these cases of group criminality 
that take place in the absence of sustained rational deliberation. Although this is 
a multilayered question, this much is certain: despite the lack of deliberation, the 
participants still jointly intend to commit the crime, so the imposition of 
vicarious liability of the group’s overall activity would hardly violate the principle 
of culpability. 
C. Applying the Shared Intentions Theory to International 
Criminal Law 
The appropriate course of action is to take the theory and apply it to the 
five hypotheticals presented at the beginning of the section and then compare 
the results it yields to the results that we achieved with the ICC’s control theory 
of co-perpetration. If I am correct, a theory of joint intentions provides better 
answers to the hypotheticals than the control theory. This does not mean that 
control as a criterion is irrelevant, but simply that its centrality has been 
exaggerated. Just as the case law and scholarly literature in 1997 revealed an 
unreflective acceptance of JCE, we are rapidly and worrisomely coming to a 
current situation where blind and unreflective acceptance of JCE is being 
replaced with a hagiographic approach to the control theory of co-perpetration. 
Neither is particularly helpful; healthy skepticism should rule the day. 
If we reexamine the Love Parade stampede, the notion of joint intentions 
explains why vicarious liability should be unthinkable in such a case. The 
concertgoers in the tunnel engaged in no cooperation; nor did they reflexively 
make decisions in light of, and because of, the actions of the other concertgoers. 
Indeed, their interests were antagonistic. One might object that antagonism and 
joint intentions are not mutually exclusive. Consider two participants in a game 
competing against each other and with mutually incompatible interests; they still 
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cooperate with each other by playing the game.243 However, the Love Parade 
example can be distinguished from antagonistic game-playing cooperation 
because game-playing involves a joint intention to follow the rules of the game 
in order to mutually achieve the satisfaction of game-playing. The Love Parade 
example is devoid of either actual rule following or a shared commitment to rule 
following in order to engage in game playing. 
Compare this with Essen Lynching. Although the cooperation is rather 
spontaneous, it is clear that the members of the crowd share an intention to 
commit a collective act: the lynching of the airmen. Not only does each member 
of the crowd want to lynch the soldier, but each member of the crowd knows 
that the other members of the crowd are similarly inclined and that each will 
play his part in the gruesome deed by throwing a punch or kicking them. The 
aggregation of the individual acts does more than produce an accidental 
collective result like the Love Parade; it produces a planned action that each 
member desires. It should be noted that not all cases of mob behavior will be 
exactly the same; they can cover the entire spectrum between Love Parade and 
Essen Lynching. Some brawls might be more haphazard and less coordinated 
than Essen Lynching, but still more organized than Love Parade, like a barroom 
brawl. The key to distinguishing them is the intentionality of the participants and 
their interrelation. 
The Concentration Camp Case and the Attack Against Civilians example 
are also easy to resolve. The soldiers in the Attack Against Civilians not only 
share a commitment to a particular goal, but they also mesh subplans and each 
one is aware of his particular role in the overall endeavor. Indeed, the attack 
would not be possible (each soldier clearing a different building) without the 
coordination that results from their joint intention to commit the crime. This 
joint intention makes clear why vicarious liability is consistent with the principle 
of culpability. Although the physical actions are committed by several 
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1998) (participants in gun battle were all convicted for intentionally aiding the shooter, even 
though they were shooting at each other). The court noted that “unlike an unanticipated ambush 
or spontaneous attack that might have taken defendants by surprise, the gunfight in this case only 
began after defendants acknowledged and accepted each others’ challenge to engage in a deadly 
battle on a public concourse.” Id at 195. See also People v Abbott, 445 NYS2d 344, 347 (NY App 
Div 1981) (applying similar rule in drag racing context). The rule has been frequently criticized. 
For a general discussion, see Daniel B. Yeager, Dangerous Games and the Criminal Law, 16 Crim Just 
Ethics 3 (1997). Bratman is more sympathetic to the general idea and acknowledges that 
competitive game playing involves cooperative activity. See Bratman, Faces at 107 (cited in note 
207) (playing chess involves cooperation to play the game, though one’s opponent does not, and 
cannot, cooperative in his opponent’s plan to checkmate him). Game playing therefore involves 
meshing of subplans among the players, although not all the way down. 
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individuals, each one intends for the other to commit the action. By so doing, he 
or she makes it his own. To explain this argument, it might be helpful to 
consider other situations where actors might be legally responsible for the 
actions of another because they “make it their own.”244 In a case where a mob 
boss procures a subordinate to commit a murder, the mob boss makes the 
action his own because he wants the crime to be committed and uses his 
subordinate as an instrument to make it happen.245 The Attack Against Civilians 
exists on a spectrum with the mob boss, although this time each soldier makes 
the collective action his own, not because each uses the other soldiers as an 
instrument, but simply because each soldier intends for the group to commit the 
crime and intends to do his part to bring the collective plan into fruition. It is 
the mental state—not the actus reus—that provides the justification for the 
vicarious liability. 
The Concentration Camp case is a little more difficult, but the existence of 
joint intentionality arguably captures the ambiguity of the situation. The two 
camp guards both share a joint intention to operate a system of ill treatment of 
civilians and each knows that the other is working with them on a coordinated 
plan to achieve that result. However, the two guards clearly do not share an 
intention with the third guard to commit that particular criminal act, that is, the 
torture and rape of the civilian. The torture and rape are at best a natural 
outgrowth of the system of mistreatment that the guards have the intention of 
promoting by working at the camp. Their culpability appears to remain in a 
liminal space between a hypothetical defendant who has a joint intention to 
commit a particular crime (most culpable) and a hypothetical defendant who 
merely recklessly participates in a criminal gang knowing that some crimes might 
happen (least culpable).246 What is the moral and legal significance of their 
having a joint intention to operate a system of mistreatment, and what is the 
                                                 
244  See, for example, Nye & Nissen v United States, 336 US 613, 619 (1949), quoting United States v 
Peoni, 100 F2d 401, 402 (2d Cir 1938) (aider and abettor “in some sort associate[s] himself with 
the venture, that he participate[s] in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he 
seek[s] by his action to make it succeed”); State v Gladstone, 474 P2d 274, 278 (Wash 1970) 
(defendant who directed an agent of the police to someone who might be willing to sell marijuana 
not guilty of aiding and abetting because no evidence that defendant did something in association 
or connection with the seller to accomplish the crime). 
245  This is best described as an example of indirect perpetration. The ICC case against al-Bashir is 
based on this doctrine. For a general discussion, see Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, On the 
Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at The Hague?, 6 J Intl Crim 
Just 853 (2008). 
246  Compare Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 ¶ 350 (cited in note 103) (“[aware] that a circumstance exists 
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”), with id ¶ 352 (“accepts such an 
outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it (also known as dolus 
eventualis)”). 
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moral and legal significance of the lack of any joint intention with regard to that 
particular criminal act? My point here is not to defend a particular moral 
conclusion for how we should treat the two guards in the Concentration Camp 
example. Rather, my point is to emphasize that a theory of joint intentions gets 
to the heart of the nuanced culpability of the guards in this example. 
One might object that the control theory was invoked by the ICC as a 
method of distinguishing between co-perpetrators and accomplices—that is, 
distinguishing between levels of participation in a criminal endeavor—and not 
grounding vicarious liability.247 And certainly the ICC’s use of the control theory 
suggests that they also implicitly considered some notion of a shared or joint 
intention as a relevant consideration, since the ICC requires a finding of an 
agreement or common plan among the co-perpetrators.248 The question is 
whether control is the right barometer with which to distinguish between co-
perpetrators and accomplices. According to the ICC, accomplices contribute to 
the endeavor but have no control over the outcome. They are not in a position 
to determine whether the crime actually happens or not. Although this is one 
plausible avenue for distinguishing between principals and their accomplices, 
one might also invoke the concept of joint intentions to do the job. Under this 
proposal, those who jointly intend to commit the crime with each other would 
be liable as co-perpetrators (or some other designation), whereas those who 
simply assist the group with mere knowledge that their assistance will help complete 
the crime are then labeled as accomplices. If the joint intentions theory is 
capable of making this distinction (and doing it better), it is unclear what is left 
for control as a criterion to do. 
This is arguably what the ICTY Trial Chambers in Kvočka and Stakić were 
getting at.249 The trial chambers in both cases insisted that JCE could be revised 
so that it distinguishes between those who co-perpetrated a JCE and those who 
aided and abetted the JCE.250 And the distinction between the two categories 
was not based on control, but rather co-perpetrators were those who intended 
to commit the crime while the accomplices merely assisted with knowledge that 
                                                 
247  See id ¶ 327.  
248  See id ¶ 344. The agreement can either be to commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the statute, 
or a common plan towards a non-criminal goal that will nonetheless result in a crime as a 
necessary outcome. See id ¶ 352 (describing this level of culpability as dolus directus).  
249  See Stakić, IT-97-24-T ¶ 441 (cited in note 119); Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 249 (cited in note 112) 
(“The Trial Chamber also considers that it is possible to co-perpetrate and aid or abet a joint 
criminal enterprise, depending primarily on whether the level of participation rises to that of 
sharing the intent of the criminal enterprise. An aider or abettor of a joint criminal enterprise, 
whose acts originally assist or otherwise facilitate the criminal endeavor, may become so involved 
in its operations that he may graduate to the status of a co-perpetrator of that enterprise.”). 
250  See Kvočka, IT-98-30/1-T ¶ 284 (cited in note 112). 
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they were helping the group commit the crime.251 Although both are concerned 
in the criminality, their modes of participation—and their mental states—are 
fundamentally different. The one problem with the doctrinal innovation of the 
Trial Chamber is that the court failed to give the necessary theoretical analysis to 
explain why the distinction was both fruitful and necessary. Indeed, both 
decisions were rather skeletal on theory. I submit that if the court had laid a 
proper foundation for its doctrinal distinction, by developing an explicit theory 
of joint intentions, the rationale for its decision would have been far clearer—
and ultimately more influential.252 
The same issue plagues the Rome Statute. Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute 
penalizes individuals involved in group criminality when they make a 
contribution with the intent to aid the group in committing the crime or with 
knowledge of the group’s intent to commit the crime.253 The intuitive problem 
with this provision is that its two subsections appear to inculcate two completely 
different classes of criminals—principals and accomplices—and group them 
under the same umbrella. This repeats the same conceptual error of JCE. On its 
face, individual responsibility for both classes is unproblematic and 
controversial; their grouping together in Article 25(3)(d), though, suggests a moral 
equivalency that belies our intuitions regarding their different levels of 
culpability. And I believe this Article has clearly articulated the foundation for 
their differing culpability: principals of group crimes share an intention for the 
group to commit the crime, while accomplices do not.  
D. Restrictions on Vicarious Liability 
It should now be clear why vicarious liability for actions falling outside the 
scope of the criminal plan is so controversial.254 Insofar as the action falls 
                                                 
251  Id. 
252  The Trial Chamber’s attempt to split JCE into two separate categories—aiding and abetting a JCE 
and co-perpetrating a JCE—was immediately rejected by the Appeals Chamber. See Kvočka, IT-
98-30/1-A ¶¶ 90−92 (cited in note 116). The Appeals Chamber engaged in a similar rebuke of the 
Trial Chamber in Stakić. See Stakić, IT-97-24-A ¶¶ 59–62 (cited in note 102). 
253  For a full analysis of Article 25(3)(d), see Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 New Crim 
L Rev 406 (2009). 
254  See, for example, Danner and Martinez, 93 Cal L Rev at 137 (cited in note 195) (JCE as the 
nuclear bomb of the international prosecutor’s arsenal); Powles, 2 J Intl Crim Just at 619 (cited in 
note 187) (broad nature of JCE could lead to “unfortunate miscarriage of justice” if Trial 
Chambers are not vigilant in ensuring sufficient evidence in support of allegations and rigorous 
scrutiny of the evidence); Ambos Brief at *1, 13, 15–19, (cited in note 60) (rejecting JCE III as 
incompatible with fundamental principles of criminal law theory); Ohlin, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 81 
(cited in note 63) (“The more subtle avenue would have distinguished between actions taken with 
mere knowledge of the conspiracy and those taken to intentionally advance the conspiracy. The 
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outside the scope of the collective plan, there was no shared intention to commit 
the wayward crime. Since the joint action was based on an initial agreement to 
commit the crime, the defendant’s intention is predicated on that initial 
agreement. Nor does it matter whether the wayward action was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the criminal plan.255 These individual wayward 
actions cannot be attributed back to the defendant; the shared intention was 
entirely different. The problem with the JCE doctrine was never its “subjective” 
approach, but rather its insistence on vicarious liability for acts that fall outside 
the scope of the original criminal agreement (JCE III). Indeed, JCE III should 
never have been developed in the first place because, as demonstrated in this 
Article, it is inconsistent with the very theory that animates the JCE doctrine.256 
Defendants in a JCE III case do not have a shared intention to commit the 
crime in question, and therefore they do not have the requisite mental state to 
place them in the same category as the principal perpetrator who committed the 
act. In addition to its deficiencies at the level of criminal law theory, JCE III is 
unsupported by either the current Rome Statute or the international case law; 
future international courts ought to reject it.257 The ICC’s control theory suffers 
from similar deficiencies: the use of dolus eventualis as a permissible mental state 
effectively guts the objective requirement of a common criminal plan. 
A theory of joint intentions nicely explains why the restrictions outlined in 
Part II of this article are absolutely necessary. The two restrictions, now 
conceptually linked, include eliminating vicarious liability for actions that fall 
outside the scope of the original agreement, and differentiating levels of 
participation in the group endeavor. The former restriction is required by the 
theory because, for those actions that fall outside the scope of the original plan, 
there is no joint intention with regard to that criminal action. And if the joint 
intention grounds vicarious liability in the first instance, the absence of a joint 
intention with regard to that one criminal act requires rejection of the 
application of vicarious liability to all other members of the group. The latter 
restriction is required because those who carry the joint intention for the group 
                                                                                                                              
former should yield the lightest liability while the latter should yield the heaviest. But the actions 
of a joint criminal enterprise cannot be attributed to both equally.”). 
255  Compare with Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 224 (cited in note 1). 
256  For an example of this tension, see D’Ottavio (cited in note 75), cited in Cassese, 5 J Intl Crim Just 
at 119−20 n 12 (cited in note 83) (“There also exists a psychological causation in that all the 
participants shared the conscious will to engage in an attempt to unlawfully detain a person while 
foreseeing a possible different crime, as can be inferred from the use of weapons: it was to 
anticipate that one of them might have shot at the fugitives with a view to achieving the common 
purpose of capturing them.”). The Italian Court of Cassation seems unbothered by the fact that 
the “shared conscious will” of the participants did not include the crime for which they were 
convicted. 
257  See Section III.A. 
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to commit the crime are categorically different from those who merely assist the 
endeavor with knowledge that their assistance will facilitate the group’s efforts. 
What justifies this categorical distinction? Simply put, those who carry the joint 
intention are guilty of an intentional act, while those without the joint intention 
are, at most, guilty of a crime of knowing facilitation or complicity. If at some 
point an accomplice changes his or her attitude about the group’s endeavor, and 
intends for the group to commit the crime, then the accomplice graduates to the 
status of co-perpetrator where greater liability is appropriate.258 
In the end, the appropriate course of action is not to replace JCE with the 
control theory of perpetration, but rather reform JCE and eliminate JCE III 
because it fails to comply with the underlying theory supporting the doctrine. 
The latest developments in the case law may support this prescription. In May, 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) issued a 
decision rejecting JCE III.259 In a well-crafted and tightly argued opinion that 
bodes well for the young tribunal, the Pre-Trial Chamber examined all of the 
historical precedents in the post-World War II era and went well beyond the 
cases cited by the ICTY in Tadić.260 The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that, 
although some form of joint enterprise liability was already part of customary 
international law in the 1970s when the Khmer Rouge atrocities were 
committed, there was insufficient evidence of a similar norm regarding vicarious 
liability for criminal acts outside the scope of the criminal plan.261 Prosecutions 
before the ECCC will now proceed with joint enterprise liability but without the 
darling of the prosecutor’s nursery: JCE III. 
Even more than the result, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning was striking.262 
International tribunals applying JCE usually just cite Tadić, under the assumption 
                                                 
258  One might object that this joint intentions theory could potentially label thousands of minor 
participants as co-perpetrators, simply based on their joint intention. Are factory workers making 
munitions guilty as co-perpetrators if they exhibit a joint intention to use the weapons as part of a 
criminal plan? The answer is simple: such cases should not be resolved by changing the required 
mental state for the doctrine, but rather by further examination of the level of contribution 
required to the plan as part of the objective element. If one adopts the differentiated version of 
JCE discussed in Section III.B, the level of contribution could be used to distinguish between co-
perpetrating a JCE and aiding and abetting a JCE. A full analysis of the required level of 
contribution (de minimus, substantial, or indispensable) for vicarious liability is outside the scope 
of the present Article. 
259  See JCE Appeals Decision (cited in note 104). 
260  See id ¶ 65 (discussing Justice and RuSHA cases). 
261  See id ¶ 87. 
262  For a criticism of the PTC decision regarding JCE III, see David Scheffer and Anthony Dinh, The 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s Significant Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise for Individual Responsibility, Cambodia 
Tribunal Monitor (June 3, 2010), online at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/images/CTM/ctm 
scheffer dinh jce commentary 3 june 2010.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2010) (arguing inter alia that the 
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that even if JCE was not a part of customary law after World War II, there is 
ample evidence today that JCE is an indelible part of modern ICL.263 But the 
substance of the ECCC’s decision suggests that Tadić, as a precedent, is more 
problematic than that. The ICTY argued that JCE was supportable as judicial 
interpretation of Article 7 of the ICTY Statute because, inter alia, JCE was a part 
of customary international law dating back to the World War II cases, and that 
one should read the inclusion of the concept of “commission” in Article 7 of the 
ICTY Statute against this background.264 If a subsequent court demonstrates, 
convincingly, that this historical interpretation of customary international law is 
incorrect, then the very underpinnings of Tadić start to evaporate. Future courts 
might be forced to conclude that Tadić was wrongly decided. 
The ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that some concept of joint 
enterprise liability was included in the London Charter and Control Council Law 
No 10 (liability for a common plan or conspiracy), thus providing evidence of 
opinio juris regarding an emerging customary norm for these prosecutions.265 
However, although there was substantial case law support for JCE I and even 
JCE II, the ICTY’s support for JCE III rested largely on Borkum Island and Essen 
Lynching, neither of which involved “extensive legal finding[s] on the issue of 
common criminal plan or mob beatings.”266 Furthermore, the court also 
questioned in a footnote the categorization of Essen Lynching and Borkum Island as 
JCE III cases and also questioned whether any defendant who did not have the 
                                                                                                                              
decision was inconsistent with the Court’s goal of prosecuting senior leaders responsible for the 
atrocities). This argument has a long pedigree. See, for example, Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 189 (cited in 
note 1); Cassese, 5 J Intl Crim Just 109 at 117 (cited in note 83). For criticism of Tadić on this 
point, see Ohlin, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 72 (cited in note 63) (circular argument); Héctor Olásolo, 
Joint Criminal Enterprise and its Extended Form: A Theory of Co-Perpetration Giving Rise to Principal 
Liability, A Notion of Accessorial Liability, or a Form of Partnership in Crime?, 20 Crim L F 263, 285 
(2009) (failure to address principle of legality); Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 477 (cited in note 
157) (political mission of JCE). For a rebuttal of the Scheffer and Dinh article by a member of the 
defense team, see Michael G. Karnavas, Joint Criminal Enterprise at the ECCC: A Critical Analysis of 
Two Divergent Commentaries on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision Against the Application of JCE, 18−20, 
online at http://www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/pdf/JCE_at_the_ECCC.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2010) (noting that neither the Cambodian enabling legislation creating the court, nor the bilateral 
agreement with the United Nations, mentions JCE).  
263  See, for example, Stakić, IT-97-24-A ¶ 62 (cited in note 102) (suggesting that JCE is well settled 
law and binding precedent at the ICTY). 
264  See Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Šainovic & Dragoljub Ojdanic, Decision on Dragoljub Odjanić's 
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, ¶ 20 (ICTY A Ch 
May 23, 2003) (“The Appeals Chamber therefore regards joint criminal enterprise as a form of 
‘commission’ pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute.”). 
265  See JCE Appeals Decision ¶ 57 (cited in note 104). 
266  Id ¶ 75. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 750 Vol. 11 No. 2 
intent to kill was found guilty in the cases.267 Under this reading of the cases, 
none of the convictions was based on the theory that participation in the 
violence without the intent to kill could generate liability for murder.268 Italian 
cases after World War II purporting to support JCE III were rejected because 
the court in that case was not applying international law.269 
One might question the importance of JCE differentiation and limiting 
vicarious liability by noting that in each case, all members who provide 
assistance display a culpable mental state, regardless of whether they have a joint 
intention for the group to commit the crime. Individuals accused under JCE III 
display a form of recklessness or dolus eventualis, while members who assist a 
group enterprise without sharing the joint intention are still culpable insofar as 
they knowingly provide assistance of facilitation. Since these individuals are still 
culpable, it is hard to see how this represents a violation of the principle of nulla 
poena sine culpa. 
I have argued in the past that the principle of culpability implicitly includes 
a proportionality component, such that defendants should only be held 
criminally responsible according to the level of their culpability.270 If the 
constraint applies to punishment only (that is, prison terms should be 
proportional to individual culpability), then arguably the inclusion of JCE III 
defendants within the same group as JCE I and JCE II defendants is 
unproblematic, as long as they receive different prison sentences by whatever 
tribunal sentences them.271 If this view is correct, then even violating the joint 
intentions doctrine is not enough to demand revision of JCE III or any other 
extended version of joint liability doctrine. One could simply concede the point 
that JCE III is unsupported by a joint intention but then shift strategy and point 
out that JCE III is not based on intentionality at all, but rather on lower mental 
states that are nonetheless still culpable.272 Although the joint intentions theory 
presented in this Article supports vicarious liability, it was not meant to supplant 
all forms of criminal responsibility entirely, including crimes of recklessness. 
                                                 
267  Id ¶ 75 n 223, citing Powles, 2 J Intl Crim Just at 615−16 (cited in note 187), and Ohlin, 5 J Intl 
Crim Just at 75 n 10 (cited in note 63). 
268  See JCE Appeals Decision ¶ 80 (cited in note 104).  
269  Id ¶¶ 75, 82, citing D’Ottavio (cited in note 75). 
270  See Ohlin, 98 J Crim L & Criminol at 160–61 (cited in note 8). 
271  Compare Cassese, Amicus Brief ¶ 82(ii) (cited in note 105) (arguing that distinctions regarding 
culpability may be adequately assessed at sentencing in conformance with nulla poena sine culpa), 
with Ohlin, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 87–88 (cited in note 63) (requiring doctrinal distinctions to codify 
culpability gradations). 
272  See Tadić, IT-94-1-A ¶ 220 (cited in note 1) (requiring advertent recklessness or dolus eventualis). 
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However, it seems intuitively correct that the culpability principle is about 
more than just punishment.273 The criminal law engages in many functions above 
and beyond the mechanics of punishment, and the codification of culpability in 
the form of criminal law offenses, and the forms of responsibility that 
accompany them, is crucial to the other basic functions of international criminal 
justice, including (among other things) the expressive role of properly declaring 
the international community’s precise condemnation of the criminal activity, and 
the role of vindicating the rule of law.274 While there are many other ways of 
expressing these additional roles over and above punishment (vindication, 
retribution, strengthening human rights norms, etc), it seems intuitively the case 
that proper identification of the level of culpability is absolutely central. But 
why? One possible answer is that it is simply an a priori goal to have criminal law 
doctrine properly codify different levels of culpability. 
In recent writings, Frédéric Mégret, drawing in part on previous writings of 
mine about JCE, has argued that this goal could also be expressed as a question 
of “fair labeling.”275 Under this view, criminal defendants—in both domestic and 
international courts—have a basic human right to fair labeling of their criminal 
conduct. The criminal process owes an obligation to criminal defendants to 
properly label their criminal conduct, and this obligation is more basic and 
foundational than the obligation to limit punishment to the level of their 
culpability. Indeed, one might even generate the constraint against punishment as 
initially deriving from the constraint against labeling.  
According to Mégret, the need for fair labeling stems from a human rights 
theory of the criminal law.276 Fairness (as a human rights norm) demands precise 
                                                 
273  See, for example, Kai Ambos, Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J Intl Crim 
Just 660, 665−68 (2006) (“culpa is no longer (only) the intent to cause a certain result, but the 
blameworthiness of the perpetrator’s conduct”); Paul H. Robinson, Four Predictions for the Criminal 
Law of 2043, 19 Rutgers L J 897, 903–06 (1988) (predicting continued refinement in the public’s 
conception of blameworthiness and refinement of doctrines designed to address these 
judgments). 
274  For a general discussion, see, for example, Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of 
International Criminal Law, 43 Stan J Intl L 39 (2007). 
275  Frédéric Mégret, Prospects for “Constitutional” Human Rights Scrutiny of Substantive 
International Criminal Law by the ICC, with Special Emphasis on the General Part *38 (paper 
presented at Washington University School of Law, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, 
International Legal Scholars Workshop, Roundtable in Public International Law and Theory, Feb 
4−6, 2010) (on file with the author).  
276  See id at *36. For a general discussion, see also Andrew Ashworth, The Elasticity of Mens Rea, in 
C.F.H. Tapper, ed, Crime, Proof, and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross 45 (Butterworths 
1981). 
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fidelity to appropriate labels for criminal offenses.277 Traditionally, this basic 
human rights norm generates a whole battery of procedural constraints that limit 
everything from pre-detention, the rules of evidence, the structure of the trial, 
and the final outcome of punishment. This much is well known and obvious. 
But the human rights norm also constrains criminal law doctrine itself in the 
sense that an over-extended doctrine that inflates criminal responsibility violates 
the human rights of the defendant to the fair labeling of their conduct.278 This is 
a new way of thinking of the point, by invoking the language of human rights, 
which previously was restricted to the domain of criminal procedure (as opposed 
to substantive criminal law).279 Most scholars in the past, myself included, have 
been inclined to view the matter as simply a matter internal to criminal law 
theory, namely, the normative goal of getting things right, where the 
consequence of failing to get it right means violating the principle of 
culpability.280 Regardless of the language one uses, however, the consequences 
for failing to get it right are clear. The culpability of lower participants is inflated 
and implicitly, the culpability of higher participants is deflated simply by virtue 
of their inclusion in the same category as those at the bottom of the culpability 
ladder. In addition to being theoretically unsatisfying, this result also frustrates 
the consequentialist goals of a criminal justice system (including deterrence). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the intense scrutiny regarding JCE, conspiracy, and co-
perpetration, international judges and lawyers have demonstrated insufficient 
interest in developing a deeper theory of criminal responsibility for group 
endeavors.281 The case law of the tribunals is focused almost exclusively on 
choosing the appropriate doctrine that is consistent with statutory provisions 
and customary international law. Occasionally, judges consider compliance and 
fidelity to deeper principles of criminal law, although usually under the guise of 
                                                 
277  See Mégret, Prospects at 37 (cited in note 275). 
278  See id. 
279  As evidence of the procedural assumption regarding the rights of criminal defendants, consider 
Art 14 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), General Assembly 
Res No 2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316, 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (Mar 23, 1976), which codifies, 
inter alia, equality before the law, presumption of innocence, right to a fair trial, and the right of 
appeal, but makes no reference to the content of substantive criminal law. 
280  See Ohlin, 5 J Intl Crim Just at 88 (cited in note 63) (identifying as an inherent goal of the criminal 
law the codification of moral distinctions based on culpability). 
281  The confusion surrounding Article 25 of the Rome Statute is just one example of this 
phenomenon. See, for example, Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility at 803 (cited in note 107) 
(“employment of obviously different mental concepts in this provision can hardly hide the lack of 
expertise in criminal theory when this provision was developed”). 
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discussing “general principles of law” as the term is understood by public 
international lawyers. While some judges consider the issue from the perspective 
of criminal law theory, others simply ignore it, and none hazards a foray into the 
philosophical landmines of collective action and the intentionality that generates 
it. Perhaps this is not surprising. The autonomy of law in general, and 
international criminal law in particular, has supposedly liberated lawyers from 
engagement with the allegedly indeterminate and unanswerable pre-legal 
questions of philosophy, psychology, and morality. But in nascent fields, such as 
international criminal law, there is more conceptual space (and need) for 
consideration of first-order moral and philosophical theories that ground the 
legal doctrines. Courts are often in the position of not just applying, but also of 
announcing such theories. International tribunals have a greater responsibility to 
ensure that their rules and doctrines are defensible.  
This is not to suggest that international courts ought to be ignoring the law 
when morality or philosophy counsels an alternate course. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. Rather, the point is simply that international lawyers are 
often in the position of applying modes of liability based on skeletal statutory 
language—namely, the word “committed” in Article 7 of the ICTY Statute—
that leaves great discretion to the court in terms of which criminal law doctrines 
ought to be applied. It is precisely in such situations that an international tribunal 
ought to be concerned with ascertaining the exact contours of individual 
criminal responsibility. And such an inquiry demands a broad examination of the 
foundation of that responsibility.  
This process is especially difficult when the question is individual 
responsibility for collective criminal action. This Article concludes that 
international courts ought to be developing their doctrine around the concept of 
joint or shared intentions—a philosophically nuanced theory that posits 
vicarious liability when groups of individuals each intend for their group to 
complete a crime and each individual acts according to the reciprocal nature of 
this joint intention. This phenomenon of joint intentions both justifies the 
application of vicarious liability imposed by international tribunals and also 
explains why it is so important to distinguish between criminal defendants who 
merely exhibit recklessness (under the current JCE III) from those who directly 
intend the consequences of their criminal participation. This is the doctrinal 
payoff of the joint intentions theory. 
